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Abstract
This thesis argues that Nigeria can adapt its tax system for better gain from
investment and other taxation. It outlines the foundation for a good tax policy, and
explores initiatives by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD and the United Nations (UN) regarding harmful tax practices and tax
incentives. Their recommendations and those of scholars, conclude that tax incentives
are ineffective in attracting foreign direct investment, may result in taxpayer abuse,
and erode the revenue base of capital importing countries like Nigeria. Utilizing
internationally accepted features on effective tax incentive design, examining the
operation of the Nigerian tax system in their light, and accepting that distortion in the
tax regime is inevitable, the analysis recommends balanced solutions to Nigeria’s tax
policy and economic problems. It urges tax law reform through policy and fresh
legislations, while correcting such problems as official corruption in Nigerian tax
administration.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1.1 The Importance of a Robust Tax System
Nigeria bemoans revenue shortage1 due to dropping oil prices and serial attacks on
pipelines.2 Meanwhile the Nigerian tax system has been ineffective in raising revenue
for the state.3 I argue that beyond the need for economic diversification, which has
long been acknowledged with no concrete action to work toward it,4 Nigeria must
close the loopholes in its tax system. Specifically, harmful tax practices, which are a
drain on the nation’s potential for fiscal viability, must be curtailed. The particular
practice which, overall, is the focus of this thesis, is the national system of general and
sectoral incentives whose collective goal is to attract investment and, thus, to spur
national economic development. But this composite regime works to undermine
realization of the very goals that constitute the justification for its enactment.
Harmful tax competition enables the erosion of the tax base.5 It should be pointed out
also that by allowing harmful tax competition under its laws, Nigeria enables the

1

Olalekan Adetayo, “Nigeria has become poor”, The Punch (11 August 2016), online:
<http://punchng.com/nigeria-is-a-poor-country-says-buhari/>; See also Oyetunji Abioye, “External
Reserves
Shed
2.1%
in
one
month”,
The
Punch
(20
August
2016),
online:<http://punchng.com/external-reserves-shed-2-1-one-month/>.
2
The Niger Delta Avenger bombed several crude oil export pipelines which further depressed the
economy of Nigeria. See Ovie Okpare, “Niger Delta Avengers Bomb ExxonMobil pipeline”, The
Punch (26 July 2016) online: < http://punchng.com/niger-delta-avengers-bomb-exxon-mobilpipeline/>.
3
Miftahu Idris & Tunku Salbabinti Tunku Ahmad, “Tax Revenue and Macroeconomic Growth in
Nigeria: A contextual Analysis” (2017) 3:2 Asian J Econ, Bus & Acc 1 at 3.
4
The Federal Government is currently promoting the Agricultural sector as an alternate source of
revenue for Nigeria. This is to be achieved through the Anchor Borrowers Scheme. This is likely to
result in a two-prong benefit of conserving scarce foreign exchange as well as a revenue earner, if
exported,
in
addition
to
helping
to
promote
food
security,
online:
<https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2017/dfd/anchors%20borrowers%20programme%20guidelines%20dec%20%202016.pdf>.
5
OECD, Harmful Tax Practices-2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regime: Inclusive Framework
on BEPS: Action 5 (Paris: OECD, 2017) at 12.
[1]

erosion of the tax base of other countries.6 This alters normal trade and investment
patterns, thereby undermining the fairness and neutrality of tax systems.7 Thus, for
Nigeria, as for other states, the losses of tax revenue hinder the state from being able
to afford infrastructure and related facilities needed to support the economy and social
services.
This chapter provides an overview of the basic principles of taxation that, if
reasonably well observed, could help all nations run efficient revenue systems in the
current global economic environment. It examines the purposes that a good tax policy
is meant to serve, and reviews the criteria for assessing such a policy for its
soundness. The overriding argument is that observance of the composite principle of
transparency engenders tax compliance. Building from this, the chapter also analyzes
tax expenditure and its policy implementation in its positive and negative aspects. In
essence, this chapter makes an argument for what comprises a good national tax
policy and what factors should inform beneficial tax policy implementation in an
efficient tax jurisdiction in line with economic and social development objectives.8
1.2

What is a Good Tax Policy?

A good tax policy is one that functions as an effective tool for achieving its assigned
government goals. It is one that is designed to support government in raising the
revenue required to finance its expenditure, in stabilizing the economy, in achieving a
generally acceptable distribution of income and in pursuing the appropriate level and

6

George Lent, Tax Incentive for Investment in Developing Countries (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
1976) at 308.
7
OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (Paris: OECD, 1998) at 8.
8
Reuven Avi- Yonah, “International Tax as International Law” (2004) 3:2 U Mich J L & Econ 1 at 3.
[2]

quality of economic growth.9 The prevailing view is that good tax policy must ensure
that everyone bears an equitable tax burden according to their ability to pay.10
All governments use tax policy to regulate private activities in order to promote
certain economic and social policies. This also means that decisions as to who to tax,
what to tax, and when to do so, arise from fundamental social and economic
considerations.11 As a matter of international economic exchange, trade barriers are
continually coming down, making capital more mobile and highlighting that the
formation of sound tax policy is a must for every country. 12
The need to replace foreign trade taxes with domestic taxes has been accompanied by
growing concerns about profit diversion by foreign investors due to weak provisions
against tax abuse in national tax laws, as well as inadequate technical training of tax
auditors in many developing countries.13 A concerted effort to eliminate these
deficiencies is, therefore, of utmost urgency. Every country’s tax policy must
recognize and consider the effect of what goes on in other countries. Thus, it is
obvious that the administration of tax law requires international coordination and cooperation. In today’s global economy, this has become fundamental to good tax policy
in each country.14
1.3 Why Do We Need a Good Tax Policy?
It is imperative for states to have a sound tax policy. There are probably more reasons
that justify the need for states to have good tax policies than can be canvassed in this
thesis. Five of the salient ones are identified here. First, without a doubt, the provision
9

Tim Edgar et al, Materials on Canadian Income Tax,14th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 65.
Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves (London: The MIT Press, 1996) at 13.
11
Peter W Hogg et al, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 8th ed (Ontario: Carswell, 2013) at 4.
12
Ibid at 14.
13
Vito Tanzi & Howell Zee, Tax Policy in developing countries (Washington DC: IMF, 2001) at 1.
14
Tim Edgar et al, supra note 9 at 41.
10

[3]

of social infrastructure is indispensable to the development, growth and expansion of
any society. This requires huge funds to actualize. It is for this reason that revenue
mobilization is key to sustainable development in any society. Governments naturally
show great concern for how funds can be made available to execute their social
programmes, including the provision of infrastructure and social services. For
developing states in general, taxation offers an antidote to dependence on external aid.
It also provides fiscal resources on a sustainable basis to promote the growth they
seek.15
A second reason that justifies the need for a good tax policy is that the tax system
must be able to raise essential revenue without excessive borrowing,16 and, in the
process, to not discourage economic activity, but ensure that the economy is
competitive.17 This is why increasing attention have been directed by many
jurisdictions to how tax instruments can be employed to redistribute income and
create incentives to generate more efficient outcomes in private markets.18 Good tax
policies harness these tools to support and achieve a nation’s economic policy
objectives.
A third reason is the need to deal with tax evasion and avoidance schemes. These
undermine the goal of wealth redistribution, which is one of the outcomes taxation
policy usually seeks to achieve.
Fourth, it must be kept in mind that the new world that we live in makes national
boundaries less important to business and investment. Even though political
boundaries and national sovereignty are relevant in non-economic areas, a robust tax
15

OECD, “Taxation revenues as a motor for sustainable development” in Development Co-operation
Report 2014: Mobilizing Resources for Sustainable Development (Paris: OECD, 2014) at 92.
16
Micah Leyira et al, ‘‘Tax Systems in Nigeria- Challenges and the Way Forward” (2012) 3:5
Research J Fin & Acc at 1.
17
Tanzi & Zee, supra note 13 at 1.
18
Mark Sproule-Jones et al, Taxes as instruments of Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1994) at 4.
[4]

policy is unavoidably influenced by international factors. Hence, a tax system needs
to be constantly reviewed in the context of economic globalization.19 The flexibility
needed for this must be built into a good tax policy in each jurisdiction.
Finally, the need for a good tax policy is justified by the concept of taxation itself,
along with its practical implications for what the government does to tax economic
actors. Tax has been defined as a “compulsory charge imposed by a public authority
on the income of individuals and companies as stipulated by government decrees, acts
or case law, irrespective of the exact amount of services rendered to the payer in
return.’’20 Tax is designed to raise the revenue required for the expenditure authorized
in a government budget, and budget expenditure is meant to promote social and
economic justice and equality among citizens and social groups within the state.
Obviously, as such a powerful tool for economic and social policy making, taxation
enables governments to levy compulsory contribution from individuals, firms or
property to fund its operations.21 Being, therefore, the principal source of revenue to
most governments, the generation of tax revenue is intricately linked to the tax base
and the tax rate.22 Revenue can be increased or decreased by enlarging or contracting
the tax base. The smaller the base, the higher the rate required to generate a given
amount of revenue. 23
Taxes being an instrument of resource redistribution from those favored by the market
economy to those less advantaged,24 it becomes the civic responsibility of citizens to
pay their taxes as their contribution to the development and administration of society
at large. This is why the presence of good tax policy and its effective and efficient
19

Peter W. Hogg et al, supra note 11 at 58.
Olalekan Soyode & Sunday O Kajola, Taxation Principles and Practice in Nigeria (Abeokuta:
LekSilicon, 2015) at 4.
21
Vern Krishna, Fundamentals of Income Tax, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 12.
22
Ibid at 34.
23
Ibid at 36.
24
Idris & Ahmad, supra note 3 at 4.
20

[5]

administration is imperative to overcome tax resistance.25 Otherwise, government
cannot equitably apportion the tax burden, stimulate private choice, allocate resources
and shape the economic welfare of its citizens. The basic elements of fiscal policy,
namely, taxation and spending, require efficient regulation to achieve equitable
outcomes. The health of this whole edifice is rooted in the tax concept and this must
be underlain by good tax policy. This is why the erosion of the tax base is a growing
concern for all governments. A good tax policy must find ways to keep this under
check.
1.4

Functions of A Good Tax Policy

In view of the reasons that justify the need for a good national tax policy, the logical
question is what purposes or functions are served in the development of good fiscal
policy. A good tax policy should be characterized by the four functional features
discussed below.
1.4.1 Efficient Resource Allocation
The first major function of fiscal policy is to determine exactly how funds will be
allocated.26 This is closely related to the issues of taxation and spending, because the
allocation of funds depends upon the collection of taxes and government use of it for
specific purposes. The national budget determines how funds are allocated. This
means that a specific amount of money is set aside for purposes specifically laid out
by the government. This has a direct economic impact on the country.

25

Ierkwagh Kwaghkehe & Shankyula Tersoo Samuel, “Global Perspectives in Tax Evasion and
Avoidance: The Legal Quagmire in Nigeria” [2009] Nigerian Inst of Advanced Leg Stud J Bus L 158
at 158, online: <www.nials-nigeria.org/journals/Ierkwagh%20and%20Shankyula.pdf>.
26
Idris & Ahmad, supra note 3 at 3.
[6]

Government has to provide for public goods and services such as national defence,
health, education, police, government administration, and so on. These goods and
services confer benefits that cannot be easily restricted to those willing and able to
pay, and so, cannot be provided through market mechanisms; government has to
provide them. This resource allocation responsibility reverts to tax policy to lay out
the parameters by which the needed resources can be secured, hence the importance
of such a policy.27
1.4.2 A Morally Acceptable Distribution of Income
Second, the government, through its tax and expenditure policy, affects distribution of
household income in a manner that is supposed to be just and fair between rich and
poor. The redistributive function of taxation is required in a market economy where
wealth can become too concentrated in a few hands. The centuries-old means of
progressive taxation is meant to bring equity into the tax burden borne by the rich and
poor. The rich pay more as a percentage of their income than the poor, and what they
pay finances schemes which benefit the poor.
1.4.3 Economic Stabilization
Third, stabilization is another important function of fiscal policy, in this case, to
ensure stable economic growth. Each nation’s economy experiences fluctuations, like
economic boom and depression. Such changes benefit some and harm others.28 Fiscal
policy is designed to anticipate and mitigate the effects of these events. Consequently,
it is necessary for the government to put in place appropriate policy measures to affect

27

Ibid at 3.
S M Adesola, Tax Laws and Administration in Nigeria, 3rd ed (Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo
University Press, 1998) at 5.
28

[7]

aggregate demand. Called stabilization measures, they are aimed to avoid inflation
and unemployment situations.29
1.4.4 Economic Growth and Market Efficiency
A fourth major function of fiscal policy is to spur development and thus economic
growth.

An adjunct to economic growth is efficiency, which is a reality beyond

producing goods at the lowest possible cost. Efficiency means providing consumers
with goods and services with the least use of scarce resources. Economists argue that
if markets are competitive, if accurate information is available, if resources are
mobile, and if individuals engaging in the transactions bear their full costs and receive
the full benefits of their transactions, economic efficiency will be achieved.30 Markets
rarely meet all these criteria, and when deviations from the ideal occur, the result is
said to be market failure.31 Sometimes deviations from the ideal are minor and do not
pose significant costs to society, but when deviations are significant, there is often a
call for government intervention.32
For instance, a type of market failure that leads to externality is pollution. An
externality is an activity that has effect on people not involved in the particular
transaction. Thus, when a manufacturing company causes pollution, there is a
transaction between the company and the consumer who purchases the product. But if
one who lives near the plant suffers from asthma due to the smog it produces, this
becomes the case of an affected party not directly compensated from the transaction.33
Externalities will generally cause competitive markets to behave inefficiently from a

29

Ibid.
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Kwaghkehe & Samuel, supra note 25 at 5.
33
Idris & Ahmad, supra note 3 at 4.
30

[8]

social perspective, since those involved in the transaction do not bear its full costs.34
In this case, government may intervene by taxing the transaction and using the money
to negate the harmful effects or to compensate those affected by the negative
externality.35 For instance, in many Canadian provinces, like Nova Scotia, there is a
small charge – often 5 or 10 cents on beverage containers made of glass or plastic.36
This charge is partially refundable if the empty container is taken to the recycling
plant. Similarly, when a transaction produces positive externalities, efficiency is
achieved when the government subsidizes the transaction.37 Education is an example
of a transaction that has a positive effect on society.
Another market that does not operate efficiently on its own are public goods. A public
good has two attributes: non-excludability, which means the producer cannot prevent
the use of the good by others, and non-rivalry, which means that many people can use
the good simultaneously.38 Free markets will generally produce less than the optimal
amount when a good is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, which means that a
government can make the market more efficient by producing the public good. By
using tax revenue, governments can avoid the problem of free riders and produce an
efficient quantity of public goods even when the free market cannot. 39 Perfect
examples of these are public utilities, such as transportation facilities, and public
services, like healthcare and education.
In summary, a good fiscal policy should provide for measures that spur both
economic growth and efficiency, seeing that both are mutually reinforcing. The

34

Ibid at 4.
Ibid.
36
It is common knowledge that for purchase of products in packs, cans, there is a 10 cent charge.
37
Idris & Ahmad, supra note 3 at 4.
38
Ibid at 4.
39
Ibid.
35

[9]

logical question that arises, therefore, is how a good tax policy premised upon a good
fiscal policy can be assessed. This matter is considered next.
1.5 Criteria for Assessing a Good Tax Policy
Tax policy is concerned with the efficiency of transfer of resources from citizens to
the government by way of taxes, and the value and benefit that society derives from
the process.40 To this end, it is imperative that the policy ensures not only that revenue
is secured in an equitable, efficient and sustainable manner, but also that the revenue
generation process has an overall symmetry.41 The symmetry principle refers to
identical treatment of citizens for tax purposes in relation, for instance, to the taxation
of capital gain and the deductibility of its losses.
The criteria that have emerged for evaluating good tax policy relate to the equity,
neutrality and simplicity of the policy and the regime it fosters.42 The internalization
of domestic economics demands that the principles be modified and added to in order
to regulate specific features of each domestic economy.43 Some of the additional
principles are competitiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, fairness,

certainty,

administrability, flexibility, transparency and accountability. Commentators like Neil
Brooks, Peter Hogg, Joanne Magee and Jinyan Li recognize equity, neutrality and
simplicity as the traditional criteria for evaluating a tax policy.44 It should be noted as
well that the additional principles are cognate with these three and share considerable

40

Soyode & Kajola, supra note 20 at 12.
The symmetry rule can also be viewed in instances where the cost of imported goods is deflated for
custom duties payment and the real value used for the purpose of computing the allowance.
42
Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 10 at 41.
43
Ibid at 42.
44
Neil Brooks, “The Logic, Policy and Politics of Tax Law” in Tim Edgar et al, eds, Materials on
Canadian Income Tax, 14th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 65. See also Peter W Hogg et al,
Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 8th ed (Ontario: Carswell, 2013) at 46.
41

[10]

commonality with them. The discussion that follows takes all of them into account to
evaluate a tax policy as to its efficiency.
1.5.1 Equity
The first criterion is that a good tax policy must be equitable. It must be fair and seen
to be fair. The tax burden must be equitably shared among taxpayers. In determining
how this can be done, the principles of benefit and ability to pay provide some
insight.45 The benefit principle suggests that the rate for high income and wealthy
taxpayers should be higher because they have more to lose if government withdraws
essential services like defense, police, the justice system, and so on.46 The ability to
pay principle demands that the tax burden be related not to what a family receives
from government, but to its ability to bear the burden. The rate structure is the most
visible tool that underscores government commitment to social justice.47 It is
particularly unfair when a highly-paid executive receives tax free economic benefits.48
This is clearly against the principle of equality of sacrifice. Hence, failure to tax fringe
benefits violates the principle of equity.49
Two aspects of the fairness of the system are vertical and horizontal equity. The
horizontal equity principle states that taxpayers with the same income should pay
equal taxes. The vertical equity principle states that the tax liability of taxpayers in a
good tax system should increase as income increases and decrease as income
decreases.50
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Information exchange is vital to enhance tax fairness and equity in the global tax
environment and to promote economic development. Equity has also been cited as
one of the reasons for worldwide taxation of individuals.
1.5.2 Neutrality
Second, a good tax policy must be neutral. It must not promote any form of tax bias.51
Thus, it must minimize interference in the resource allocation process.52 For example,
the top marginal personal income tax rate should not materially differ from the
corporate income tax rate, such that it provides an incentive for taxpayers to choose
the corporate form of doing business, purely for the purpose of tax avoidance. This is
because professionals and small entrepreneurs can, over time, easily siphon off profits
through expense deductions and permanently escape the highest personal income tax
bracket.53 This criterion proposes that the tax system should be neutral so that
decisions are made, generally, on their economic merits and not necessarily for tax
reasons.54
In the international context, all investments within a country should face the same tax
burden, regardless of whether they are owned by a domestic or a foreign investor
(taxing non-residents and residents similarly).55 As well, investors should pay
equivalent taxes on capital income, regardless of the country in which the income is
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earned (taxing foreign source income and the domestic income of a resident
similarly).56
However, there are instances where departure from the neutrality principle is
unavoidable. Government may deliberately create distortion by taxing, for instance,
polluting industries or by subsidizing certain things such as education. Government
may deliberately subsidize education through tuition fee credits, tuition and textbook
credits and exemption of scholarship from tax, because it places a premium on having
educated citizens and wishes to encourage people to receive education.57
Neutrality also means that a tax policy should ensure that tax rates are not a
disincentive to taxpayers engaging in paid work,58 or seeking to increase wealth
through savings because taxes are too great a burden.59 In other words, neutrality
questions the value of imposing taxes at too high a rate to discourage participation by
the taxpayer in income-producing activity. 60
1.5.3 Administrability
This third major criterion recognizes that tax administration is a vital tool for the
development or industrialization of a nation. A core success factor for any tax system
is its ease of administrability. An effective tax policy document should, therefore,
establish clear guidelines on crucial tax administration issues.61 In reality, the
administrability factor is often evaluated in terms of the simplicity of the tax system,
its administrative practicality, how big the burden of the cost of compliance to the
56
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taxpayer is, and how low the administrative cost of raising tax revenue is in terms of
compliance and enforcement.62
That a tax system is administratively efficient is, in practice, seen in the elements of
its structure, as explained above, namely its simplicity, certainty and low compliance
and administration costs. These are now elaborated.
1.5.3.1 Simplicity
A good tax policy must not be complex but instead should be simple to understand by
the people to whom it applies. The logic of the relevant laws should be obvious such
that stakeholders understand the basis for tax imposition.63 It must be pointed out that
in many jurisdictions the effort to make taxation equitable has resulted in fine- tuning
tax rules to such an extent that they have become too complex for the average
taxpayer to understand.64 To some extent, this has led to underachievement of the tax
system in some jurisdictions.65 Some commentators have argued that it is more
beneficial to tolerate some level of inequality in order to have a simpler tax system.66
The more complex the tax system, the more the tax planning industry flourishes.67
This also undermines the simplicity factor which is important to a tax system that is
administratively efficient.
1.5.3.2 Certainty
The element of certainty is crucial to a tax system. Sometimes it is considered in the
same context as stability.68 This is because a tax system that is certain would likely be
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stable. Certainty in the tax system is important even for government because if a
government should be able to budget realistically for its imminent spending, it must
base its plans on a realistic estimate of the revenue it will receive and the funds it will
have available.69 On the flip side, the tax which an individual is bound to pay must be
certain and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, and the
amount to be paid must be clear to the contributor and to every other person. This was
echoed in the Carter Commission report to the effect that the taxpayer should be able
to determine promptly, with certainty and at a modest cost, the tax consequences of a
proposed course of action.70
1.5.3.3 Low Compliance Cost
Also, basic to the administrability of a tax system is what it costs for a taxpayer to
comply with its rules. Low compliance cost places the taxpayers’ interest at a high
premium.71 The Canadian tax filing system seems to accord the taxpayer this
premium, and for this, I supply my personal experience. During the 2016 filing season
in March/April, I volunteered at a number of Community Income Tax clinics at the
Halifax Libraries and the Dartmouth North Public Library. The taxpayer simply books
an appointment and is assisted to file his or her return free of charge, in a courteous
manner and in the shortest possible time. This costs him or her nothing except the cost
and time of getting to the location nearest to him or her. This way, the government
also ensures that the largest number possible would file their tax returns. Some private
firms charge about $100 for filing a simple tax return for the taxpayer.72
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1.5.3.4 Low Cost of Administration
Finally, for tax administration to be feasible, the process itself must not cost an undue
amount to the public purse. Consequently, there should be a thorough cost-benefit
analysis before taxes are placed on citizens. The administrative cost of collecting and
enforcing the law should be reasonable to ensure efficiency of the tax system.73 As a
matter of fact, tax administration is reasonably effective in public institutions and
agencies and most private employers because taxes are deducted at source, leaving the
net to be paid to workers. In essence, this factor demands that it must not cost more
than the money that is raised to collect the tax in the first place. Simultaneously, the
costs of enforcement must be maintained at reasonable levels, which means keeping a
rein on the tendency to make the tax system more complex.74
The argument is that the policy that founds a good tax system is judged as to its
goodness by a series of interlocking criteria. The discussion has explained the criteria
of equity, neutrality and administrability along with the factors that make the latter
feasible and efficient. Other criteria which must underlie a good tax policy and regime
relate to competitiveness, flexibility and transparency in the resultant tax structure and
its administration. These three criteria are now discussed.
1.5.4 Competitiveness
Each jurisdiction must consider the tax regimes of other countries in its region, as
well as international practices,75 so as to craft its own tax system to be competitive. A
competitive system must be marked by rates that are not too high. Otherwise, no one
will want to invest or work in that jurisdiction. Nor should rates be too low, so as to

73

Alex Easson & Eric M Zolt, Tax Incentive (Washington D.C: World Bank,2003) at 11.
Michael Carnahan, “Taxation Challenges in Developing Countries” (2015) 2:1 Asian Pac L & Pol’y
J 169 at 172.
75
Easson & Zolt, supra note 73 at 4. Alex Easson and Eric Zolt also argued that it is particularly
important to consider the tax regimes of other countries because their residents may be potential
investors or potential consumers of products produced in the country, or the country itself might be a
competitor for foreign investment inflow.
74

[16]

make the jurisdiction a “haven”. As well, a competitive system must avoid reliance
on poorly targeted tax incentives as the main vehicle for investment promotion.76 A
tax incentive should only be granted if it can be justified as helping to address some
form of market failure, especially those that involve externalities and consequences
that affect actors other than the specific beneficiary of the incentive.77 Overall, a truly
competitive tax system would not affect decisions as to where a company is
incorporated. A competitive system should ensure that the jurisdiction’s corporate
income tax rate compares favourably with those of peer nations. This is because
international competition tends to limit the tax rate that national governments can
impose.78 This also limits government expenditure for social services, as the taxes it
can levy become more acute. This is why an international agreement on tax policy to
keep national revenues from being eroded by competition is desirable;79 hence, there
is a need for regional and international consensus on cooperation between
jurisdictions.
1.5.5 Flexibility
The criterion of flexibility demands that the tax system be run in such a way that it is
responsive to changes in the local and international fiscal environments. The
introduction of new taxes and review of existing taxes should be directed to this end.
The process of adjustments should be designed such that it will pose no undue
difficulty to the process of tax administration.
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1.5.6 Transparency
Finally, it is desirable that a taxation regime be transparent, that is, accessible to the
public and in its dealings with other countries. It must not undermine the sovereignty
of other countries by, for example, the enactment of bank secrecy laws that shield the
identities of investors.80 In terms of obligations to citizens, government expenditure
must be transparent so as to encourage voluntary tax compliance by citizens. Related
to this is the taxpayers’ perception of how wisely a government spends taxpayers’
money. Compliance will be higher if taxpayers perceive that the government is not
wasteful.81 Governments must not only aim to eliminate waste; they must also
convince taxpayers that their money is being spent wisely. For instance, in Canada,
the Department of Finance annually publishes a document titled Government of
Canada: Tax Expenditure

82

in which it lists, describes and estimates the cost of its

tax expenditures. This gives an assurance of responsibility toward, and respect for
taxpayer interest and loyalty to support the state to realize its economic agenda.
The criterion of transparency demands that tax expenditures be calibrated against the
dynamics at play in realizing the socio-economic goals at stake in the performance of
the national economy. In sum, all the criteria considered just above to ensure a good
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tax policy regime must be reflected in expending the returns from the application and
administration of such a policy. The way in which this interconnected set of demands
may play out are considered next as part of the review in this thesis of tax expenditure
evaluation.
1.6 Criteria for Evaluating Tax Expenditure
Though it is expected that a good tax system should significantly conform to the
above principles of effective taxation, there are situations where non-conformity to
the principles are essential to attain some government policy goals.83 Neil Brooks
argues that “presumably, most people would agree that the fairest, most neutral, and
simplest tax system would be no tax system at all”.84 This is because in addition to its
principal function of revenue generation, the tax system is also an instrument for
achieving social and economic policy objectives. These may be realised by applying
preferential tax treatments calculated to favour certain activities, industries or
categories of persons. The preferential tax measures could be in the form of
“permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities, credits
against tax, or special rates.”85 These measures are termed tax incentives, tax
subsidies, or tax expenditures (TEs). This is because the opportunity cost of these
objectives are lower tax revenue to the government. For this reason, it is important
that the expenditures be regularly analyzed for relevance, effectiveness and
efficiency.86 In countries like Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there
is no legal obligation to prepare tax expenditure reporting. Even so, it is undertaken to
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offer insights into the budgetary cost of tax expenditure and to facilitate annual budget
discussions and debate.87
Tax expenditures (TE) can be evaluated by three approaches:88 revenue foregone,
revenue gained, and revenue outlay equivalence. It must be admitted that there are
conflicting points of view on the need to evaluate tax expenditures. For this reason, it
is necessary to mention briefly the positive and negative aspects of tax expenditures
before considering how the exercise itself is undertaken.
1.6.1 Positive Aspects of Tax Expenditures
Using the tax system as a tool for achieving social and economic objectives,89 as
opposed to alternative policy tools,90 is considered by some to be beneficial because it
is more administratively efficient for achieving public socio-economic objectives. As
well, doing so limits the possibility of fraud or abuse.91
1.6.2 Unfavorable Aspects of Tax Expenditure
Some scholars have refuted the argument that TEs can decrease tax administration
and compliance costs. They argue that TEs make tax laws complex because they
require “numerous distinctions” with respect to qualifying activities or taxpayers.92
They maintain that intricacies in the tax laws not only raise compliance costs for
taxpayers, but also make it more challenging and costly for the tax authorities to
administer tax laws. Some scholars also think that TEs reduce the fairness of the tax
system because they are usually regressive in nature. Others note that TEs are a
politically attractive alternative because they are not subject to regular scrutiny and
87
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are difficult to estimate, as opposed to direct spending programs.93 In view of these
conflicting arguments, it is necessary to verify whether the tax system is the best
approach by which to achieve intended policy objectives. This inquiry demands a
discussion of tax expenditure methodology.
1.6.3 Methods of Evaluating Tax Expenditures
Clearly, it is not in all cases that TEs are the best policy for achieving government
objectives. There is a need to assess program objectives on a case-by-case basis.94 The
2014 European Commission report95 suggests that an evaluation of the efficiency of
TEs requires identifying different policy areas and assessing how tax expenditures
could help meet given economic objectives in these areas.96 The parameters for
appraising TEs are many and multidimensional and so the task is a very challenging
one, but a more serious problem is the failure to try.97 The OECD suggests that a
thorough assessment of TEs should consider their effectiveness, distributional impact,
and compliance and administrative costs in relation to possible policy options that
could achieve the same social and economic objectives. The OECD categorized the
framework for evaluating TEs into two: ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.
An ex-ante assessment or evaluation takes place before the introduction of a TE,
while the ex-post evaluation is conducted after the TE has been in operation for a
number of years.98 These two categories involve the evaluation of TE in terms of
parameters that include, but are not limited to, the revenue costs or value of the TE to
the government, its performance in terms of meeting policy objectives, and its
economic relevance.
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The ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations discussed in this thesis draw on the
key evaluation questions suggested in the recent guidelines developed by the Ireland
Department of Finance.99 Given the numerous methods available for TE evaluation,
the Irish Department of Finance (like other sources) recognized the challenges posed
to efforts to find a comprehensive framework for this exercise. For this reason, it
sought to fill the gap by developing a concise framework that focuses on key
evaluation questions to be asked during the ex-ante and ex-post processes. These
guidelines were developed from a review of several economic literatures on tax
expenditures, and an analysis of international approaches to tax expenditure
evaluation. Drawing on the OECD’s parameters for evaluating tax expenditures in
different countries, including Canada, the United States and Germany, the guidelines
provide some robust and comprehensive criteria for evaluating TEs. While a detailed
assessment of all possible dimensions of TE evaluation is beyond the scope of this
thesis, it explores the major elements of the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation methods.
1.6.3.1 Ex-ante Assessment
This process considers whether or not to introduce a new TE into a tax system and,
thus, focuses on the rationale behind a government’s intervention in a particular area
of public policy, as well as the planning and design of the policy. According to the
OECD, ex-ante assessment comprises three stages. The first examines the need that
the new TE intends to address and the suitability of using the tax system for that
particular objective.100 The second stage identifies and sets the objectives of the
proposed TE. The last stage relates to appraising the use of the tax system as the tool
for achieving the objectives against alternative policy options. The assessment process
considers five (5) major issues that must be accounted for before the introduction of a
99
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new TE. These relate to the objective of the TE, the market failure the TE proposes to
address, the efficacy of the TE in achieving the policy objectives, the likely economic
effect of the TE and the expected cost of the TE.101
1) The objective the TE aims to achieve
Before a TE is introduced, the desired outcome should be clear. For instance, the
objective of government may be to stimulate investment in economically
disadvantaged areas. As such, the TE must be specific to a particular need,
measurable in terms of outcomes that are achievable, relevant and time bound.102
These yardsticks are important to provide a benchmark against which to measure its
effectiveness after implementation.
2) The economic impact of the TE
It is important to assess the expected impact of the TE upon identifying the
objective(s), the market failure and the suitability of the proposed TE. This can be
done by looking at the design of the TE in terms of meeting the policy objectives in
issue, as well as the influence the TE will have on connected sectors of the
economy.103 Such an evaluation can be conducted by drawing on the result of impact
assessments conducted on similar (existing) TEs within or outside the jurisdiction in
which the proposed policy104 is to be implemented. This stage of the ex-ante
assessment should also “set out criteria against which the impact and efficiency of the
scheme will be evaluated at the ex-post stage.’’105 This is particularly important so

101

Ibid at 51.
OECD, Choosing a Broad Base- Low Rate Approach to Taxation, No 19 (Paris: Tax Policy Studies
OECD, 2010) at 76.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Ireland, Department of Finance, “Report on Tax Expenditure with Guidelines: Incorporating
Department of Finance Guidelines for Tax Expenditure”, (October 2014) online :<
http://www.budget.gov.ie> at 11.
102

[23]

that arrangements for the collection of the necessary data to be used in the ex-post
stage can be put in place at the introductory stage of the TE program.
3) The expected cost of the TE
An ex-ante assessment should also examine the opportunity cost of implementing the
policy through the tax system.106 According to the OECD, the “revenue foregone”
method is the most practical approach for estimating the expected costs of the
proposed TE. This method considers the cost of the TE in monetary terms. The
calculation is based on the assumption that the revenues from other taxes remain
constant.107 Even though the calculation fails to acknowledge the behavioural aspects
of the tax incentive and any likely interactions the TEs may have with other TEs, it
provides an estimate of the revenue lost or voluntarily waived by the government as a
result of departure from the normal system of taxation.108
4) The market failure the TE intends to address
An ex-ante assessment must confirm that the proposed TE addresses an actual need
which is consistent with the government’s policy priorities.109 In addition to
identifying the objectives of the proposed TE, it is also necessary to justify the
government’s intervention in relation to the policy objective. 110 In other words, the
ex-ante assessment should examine: (i) whether there is a need for government
intervention in the area of the proposed policy, and (ii) why and how a tax break
would address that need.111
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5) Effectiveness of the TE in achieving policy objectives
An ex-ante assessment must consider whether a TE is the most appropriate method
for government intervention. Though the existence of a market failure could provide a
strong justification for government intervention in the area of the proposed policy, it
does not imply that the tax system is the most efficient means to remedy the market
failure. This is because there could be alternative policy options by which the
government could address the failure.112 This can be done by comparing the benefits
and limitations of TEs with alternative delivery options. The comparison can be done
in terms of accessibility of the proposed TE to beneficiaries, administrative cost of
implementing the policy, and the similarity of the TE to existing policy
interventions.113 The goal is to avoid duplication of policy measures.
1.6.3.2 Ex-post Evaluation
The primary focus of the ex-post evaluation is to assess the impact and continuing
relevance (or otherwise) of the TE. As earlier mentioned, ex-post evaluations are the
assessments that review the efficacy of an existing TE. These evaluations are
conducted after a particular TE has been in operation for a number of years. A major
connection between the ex-post and ex-ante evaluations is that the more effort that
went into the ex-ante evaluation in terms of identifying methods for the ex-post
evaluation and setting up the necessary data collection processes, the easier it will be
to undertake the ex-post evaluation. Therefore, an ex-post analysis is less complicated
where the necessary ex-post evaluation framework was considered during the ex-ante
assessment of the TE.114
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There are four (4) key themes in the review of existing TEs under the ex-post assessment
process. These themes are relevance, cost, impact and efficiency of the TEs.115

1) Is the TE still relevant to the circumstance that led to its implementation?
Engaging in an ex-post evaluation provides an opportunity to evaluate the consistency
of the TE with government policy priorities to determine if the TE persuasively
addresses an actual need.116 In doing this, it is necessary to evaluate the continued
relevance of a TE.117 This can be done by looking at its primary objective(s) and
taking into account the social and economic conditions or current policy priorities of
the government. The primary objectives of TEs are usually set out in policy
documents, including budget papers, news releases or minutes of legislative
committee meetings and debates.118 Evaluating these objectives is essential for
verifying whether the TE remains valid, given changes in the economy, relevant
market, industry or the government’s policy priorities since the introduction of the
TE.119
In addition, an ex-post assessment may consider other policy interventions, such as
direct expenditures or regulations that may have been initiated since the inception of
the particular TE under review. This is because the existence of alternatives that
address the policy objectives of the TE being reviewed could call into question the
need for the scheme.120 Thus, the changes in the external environment of a TE should
also be taken into account in assessing the continued relevance of the expenditure.121
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2) How much did the TE cost?
According to the OECD, there are three methods for calculating costs associated with
TEs;122 namely, by means of the revenue foregone, the revenue gained, and the outlay
equivalence. The revenue foregone method estimates the cost of the TE in terms of
the monetary amount the TE is recorded as costing the government. It calculates the
loss in government revenue incurred as a result of the TE, while holding all other
factors constant. The cost of a particular tax credit using the revenue foregone method
will be the actual monetary amount of the tax credit.
Therefore, a tax credit’s estimated cost is the figure derived from the actual take-up of
the expenditure. With respect to a tax deduction, the revenue foregone depends on the
take up rate and the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer. However, the assumption of
unchanged behaviour and unchanged revenues from other taxes makes the revenue
foregone method theoretically inadequate to provide an accurate cost estimation of a
TE. This is because the estimation “ignores the behavioural aspects of a tax incentive
and ignores any possible interaction with other tax expenditures.”123
Alternatively, the cost of TEs could be measured by the amount of the revenue gained
when they were repealed. This estimation method is called the final revenue loss
(gain) method and it calculates the potential increase in tax revenue if certain TEs are
discontinued.124 Unlike the revenue foregone method, this method considers the
behavioural effects arising from the discontinuation of a TE. Specifically, it considers
the behavioural effects on taxpayers, the potential impact the discontinuance may
have on the overall level of economic activity, as well as the effects (of the
discontinuance) on revenues from other taxes.125Thus, the method is expected to
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accurately reflect the amount of revenue that would be raised by the government if a
TE is removed from the tax system.126
The third estimation method, called the outlay equivalent method, attempts to
estimate the cost of an existing TE based on the cost of a direct expenditure which
would achieve the same policy objective(s). That is, it considers the cost of the TE in
terms of the cost of delivering the same policy objectives outside the tax system.127
Despite the shortcomings of the revenue foregone approach discussed above, this
estimation method is still considered the most attractive for many governments for
practical reasons. For one thing, most governments consider it to be a relatively
simple estimation method that does not require collecting individual or government
behavioural responses.128
3) Is the TE still meeting its objectives effectively?
The third theme in the review of a TE relates to its impact. The measure of the impact
of a TE can be determined by “establishing whether a tax expenditure has been
successful in changing behaviour, improving performance or increasing economic
activity over what would otherwise have been the case.”129 It is important to note that
the impact of a TE is closely related (but not synonymous) with its effectiveness. For
instance, if a research and development (R&D) tax credit has a very high take-up rate
amongst R&D active companies, then that tax credit could be described as an
effective scheme. But for the tax credit to have an economic impact, it should have
encouraged previously non-R&D active companies to engage in R&D, and for
existing R&D active companies to have increased levels of R&D investment.130
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However, identifying the impact of a TE through a cost benefit analysis can be
challenging because the situation that would have prevailed in the absence of a TE is
unknown. Even though the TE beneficiaries can be asked through surveys whether
their behaviour or activity (relating to the policy objective) changed as a result of the
TE, such information cannot always be relied upon.131
4) Was the TE efficient?
Finally, there is the question of the efficiency of the tax measure in view of the
implementation of the TE. The inquiry focuses on the manner in which resources are
allocated in an economy. A particular economy is said to be operating efficiently
when resources are fully employed and are producing as much output as possible.132
While a TE may have been successful in meeting its objectives, the success has to be
set against the costs of the TE to determine its efficiency. The measure of the
efficiency of a TE should also be compared to the potential efficiency of other policy
alternatives available to the government.133
1.6.4 Evaluating Tax Expenditure: Overview
It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the comprehensive picture of the
juggling exercise of tax expenditure evaluation puts many governments in a fairly
stringent fix. For one thing, either ex-ante or ex-post, the evaluation retains degrees of
uncertainty as to revenue generation or revenue loss in the short or long term, and
thus, makes it difficult to assess the benefits to the economy of applying and
administering the TE. For developing countries like Nigeria that use TEs to attract
foreign investment to improve their economies and generate revenues for social
development purposes, the uncertainty at play deepens the challenge for assessing the
benefits of their TE regimes. Even so, as discussed later in this thesis, the alternative
131

Brixi, Valenduc & Li, supra note 51 at 19.
Ireland, supra note 105 at 66.
133
Brixi, Valenduc & Li, supra note 51 at 163.
132

[29]

evaluation methods constitute ready tools for Nigeria to choose from in order to
introduce beneficial changes into the administration of its TE regime.
1.7 Conclusion
In sum, this chapter establishes that a robust tax system is fundamental to vibrant
national economic performance. Especially in developing countries, this is so to the
extent that tax revenue is a major source of funds to enable government carry out
public services, participate in stimulating economic growth, and exercise control over
the fiscal ability of major local economic actors and foreign investors to bear their due
tax responsibilities within such a structure. As shown, a key principle underlying an
equitable tax policy is transparency in tax administration.
For this reason, the exception of tax expenditure or tax incentives constitutes a
challenge that could be acceptable as equitable only to the extent that its evaluation,
either ex-ante or ex-post, is done transparently. The goal must be to secure to the state
and therefore, to the taxpayers who do not benefit from it, the returns that they would
otherwise have made.
The foregoing challenge demands an in-depth understanding of the performance and
value of tax incentives for economies in general. The literature on this subject is
considered in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Value of Tax Incentives: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature on tax incentives. The dominant theme is the
general acceptance of tax incentives as a means of attracting foreign investment.1
However, there is a division as to the effectiveness of these incentives to achieve the
purposes for which they are granted, especially in view of the domestic tax practices
of capital importing countries.2 Most scholars reject the notion of tax incentives as
compensating for deficiencies in the “investment climate to attract foreign
investment.”3 Other scholars think that there are some investment decisions that are
tax sensitive but that taxpayers will only respond after they have made the decision to
invest. The conclusion reached by this chapter is that tax incentives are not the main
determinant for foreign direct investment (FDI). Where they are, the investments
associated with their use are minimal.
The chapter proceeds by conceding the preponderance of the use of tax incentives by
developing countries. It reviews the various scholarly arguments for and against this
practice in an attempt to identify who the beneficiaries of these incentives are. It must
be pointed out that sometimes tax incentives are preserved by a tax sparing provision
in treaties. The chapter concludes with a summation of the real factors that drive
foreign direct investments.
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2.2 Cost of Tax Incentives for Economic Development
Governments have many social objectives. These can be achieved through a variety of
tools,4 including tax policy.5 It has been mentioned already that among other
purposes, taxes are used by governments to raise revenue, to correct for market
failures, and to create incentives for particular activities that they consider to be
desirable.6
Tax incentives have become some of the most widely used measures adopted in
developing countries to promote economic development.7 This is because it is easier
to provide tax incentives than to correct deficiencies in the investment climate.8
Additionally, tax incentives do not appear to require expenditure by the government.9
Tax incentives take the form of special investment tax credits, preferential tax rates,
accelerated depreciation, deferral of tax liability and favourable tax treatment for
expenditure on research and development.10 The objective for introducing them is to
encourage investment that would ordinarily not have been made but for the tax
incentive.11
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) views tax incentives as of no significance in
stimulating investment and has concluded that even when they do result in some
incremental investment, their cost often outweighs their benefits.12 Despite the IMF’s
criticisms, the use of tax incentives seems to have become more rampant as most
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countries continue to embrace their use.13 Perhaps this explains the pressure that
multinationals put on countries to adopt them. The United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development conducted a survey that shows that a number of investors
agree that even when tax incentives are not part of the factors considered to make an
investment decision, investors would still ask for them because it has a way of
improving their bottom lines.14
Virtually all developing countries offer inducements to approved firms in the form of
reductions or exemptions from import duties or income taxes for a given period of
time, tax holidays for a limited duration, regional investment incentives, reduced
import tariffs or custom duties, special trade zones and re-investment incentives.15
One goal of tax policy is to increase the ratio of taxes to national income, especially
from the growing sectors of the economy.16 But if taxes are frozen substantially in the
form of incentives, then government faces a formidable challenge in raising adequate
revenue to meet its social obligations.17 In view of its nature, therefore, and the ways
in which it can be extended, it can be said that, in sum, the cost of the incentives is
their immediate and cumulative ability to deprive the state of revenue that should
otherwise be gained to support economic development.
2.3 Tax Incentives: Why They Are Favoured
Notwithstanding their cost, developing countries desiring to attract foreign investment
tend to remove restrictions and disincentives to business by the use of fiscal
incentives. They seek to encourage those investments that would not have been made
but for the tax incentives, and that are likely to result in benefits such as transfers of
13
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technology and increased employment or investment in less desirable areas of the
country.18 This desire for foreign direct investment often hinges on the expectation
that it will generate some positive externalities,19 like increasing the skill levels of
workers, better technological knowledge transfer to be gained from the foreign
company to benefit local firms via multiplier effects,20 and advanced managerial
techniques.21 A second justification is the prospect that the presence of multinationals
will help to bridge information inadequacies22 underlying underdevelopment in the
low-income economies. A third is the hope that tax incentives would offer an easy
way to compensate for other government-created obstacles in the business
environment which, otherwise, take long to tackle.23 These justifications, it must be
admitted, constitute a formidable temptation set to which developing economies
quickly fall. It is however, conceded on empirical evidence that some forms of capital
are tax sensitive and that concessions to induce them might be needed.24
2.4 Tax Incentives: Why They Are Not Beneficial
Even so, various scholars believe and argue that some tax incentives are not
necessarily sensible. Kim Brooks thinks they amount to revenue loss to low income
countries.25 Because the incentive laws tend to be broadly targeted, they are more
likely to include even highly profitable investment which would have been made for
other reasons. She also points out that incentives motivate rent-seeking activities
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because they may give rise to large savings if the multinationals are able to lobby
successfully.26 Again, that they may foster a sense of unfairness,27 especially among
domestic firms, particularly if the incentives are available to only large foreign firms.
Beyond this, incentives may generate resentment from citizens who cannot join the
dots between their value, but could only conclude that with lesser taxes paid by
corporations, government expenditure must still be met through raising regressive
sales and excise taxes.28 Incentives also create unintended economic distortion,29 lead
to wasteful and unhealthy tax competition,30 and ultimately, to a “race to the
bottom.”31
There are other reasons why incentives are not considered to be beneficial, indeed,
particularly unnecessary. First, the claim that they are effective is difficult to prove.32
Second, that they can be used to compensate for information inadequacies rests on the
premise that investors will source sufficient information on foreign jurisdictions, no
matter how daunting it may seem.33 Thus, using tax incentives to compensate for
deficiencies in the investment climate is said to be flawed on the ground that unless
weaknesses in the investment climate are relatively marginal, granting tax incentives
to make up for them is unlikely to override negative factors like political instability,
poor enforcement of contracts and unstable exchange rate policy and control.34
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A more difficult reality to justify, it is argued, is the fact that as a departure from the
normal tax regime, a tax incentive provides opportunities for tax avoidance,35 and
introduces uncertainty into the tax system. This leads to corruption36 which
complicates the process of tax administration,37and multinationals “price in”38 these
uncertainties. On top of this, Kim Brooks points out that multinationals usually invest
in locations where the return on investment is high and,39 when the tax factors are
measured against the myriad non-tax factors which motivate their investment choices,
tax incentives only attract marginal “footloose” investment.40 In light of these grave
disadvantages to the low-income jurisdiction, she thinks that if at all, tax sparing
should be included in tax treaties between high and low income countries, rather than
it being granted reciprocally. 41
Another angle to the consideration of the non-beneficial nature of incentives focuses
on the granting of tax holidays. In this regard, Wells, et al, argue that these do not
determine the location decisions of many foreign investors.42 However, in terms of
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effectiveness, the benefits of the tax holiday pales in comparison to its cost to the host
state.43 Alex Easson and Eric Zolt actually maintain that taxes may affect decisions as
to the source of financing rather than the level of investment. This is because
investors have several alternatives for funding new ventures or expanding existing
operations. Thus, taxes are more likely to play a role in deciding whether to make a
new equity investment using internal or external borrowing, or using retained
earnings. They report that business executives admit that tax was not a major
consideration for them in deciding whether and where to invest. Rather, it influenced
their choice between countries in the same region.44 Steve Clark draws on several
empirical works to conclude that host country taxation is, indeed, an important factor
in locational decisions, and not in regard to an investment decision on its own.45
Therefore, on balance, an incentive in the form of a tax holiday would attract an
investor to such a jurisdiction, but the host state’s hope of benefit will not necessarily
bear fruit.
In view of the foregoing, some scholars argue that incentives must be granted
according to criteria that make them more predictable to investors. First, it must be
determined whether the investor would have invested in the absence of incentives.46
Second, where a corporate income tax in one jurisdiction is competitive with that of
other jurisdictions, and there is a treaty in place to avoid double taxation or double
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non-taxation, there is no reason to grant a tax holiday.47 Third, Lent48 also points out
that if taxes are low or tax enforcement is lax and evasion is prevalent, the advantages
to having any tax concessions are reduced.49 In other words, the higher the level of
taxes, and the more effective, the greater the cost of enforcing the temporary relief.50
Another criterion by which to decide on extending an incentive is to de-emphasize the
size of the potential investment. In other words, the belief that if eventually attracted,
a large investor will help to boost confidence in other potential investors is not
necessarily well founded. Louis Wells thinks that incentives, if at all, should go to the
firm that invests in the needed sectors, while tax holidays should be channeled to
other purposes, since it is better to lose a few investment opportunities than to incur
high-cost incentives.51 This means that the argument that it is economically efficient,
cheaper and equitable to reduce corporate tax rates and to “incentivize all investors”
does not remove the reality that the burden of these incentives will be borne by other
taxpayers in the form of other taxes, since government expenditures must be met.52 In
the result, the incentive shifts the tax burden, while its expected benefits may never be
realized.
In essence, Louis Wells argues that incentives can result in a net balance of payment
outflows if tax savings are remitted abroad.53 Therefore, investment incentives may
not enhance the profitability of a newly established business to contribute to a
47
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country’s economic objectives.54 In this sense, they are neither necessary nor
sufficient for any country to attract foreign investment.55 The real obstacles in the way
of attracting investment are political stability, viability of the economy and security
concerns.56 In other words, the practice of granting tax benefits in place of correcting
political or economic deficiencies is misplaced, as the incentives only play a role after
the decision to invest might have been taken.57
It is also said to be better for incentives to be extended to both foreign and domestic
investors to prevent “round tripping,” whereby domestic capital is re-imported with a
foreign label.58 In as much as tax concessions are offered to certain sectors of an
economy, the tax system should, as much as practicable, be designed to be general
and across the board.
Overall, the huge body of research on the effects of incentives establishes that
investors will only be attracted to countries where markets, investment climates and
policies are attractive, whether or not a country offers tax holidays. Therefore, the
justification that incentives will take the place of deficiencies in a country’s
“investment climate” is misplaced.59 This conclusion highlights the need to pinpoint
the real beneficiary of tax sparing arrangements,60 next.
2.5 Tax Incentives: Who Benefits from Treaty Provision on Tax Sparing?
The fact that one country decides to advocate for tax incentives does not mean others
should protect those incentives with tax sparing provisions. Foreign investment
54
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promotion agencies61are particularly culpable in demanding tax incentives. They are
quick to argue that the reason for some lost investment opportunity hinged on the
absence of tax incentives.62 Obviously, because these agencies’ performances are
measured in terms of the investment they attract, they really do not cast a care for the
economic cost of tax incentives.63 As well, because these costs are difficult to
measure, they barely resist them.64 Multinationals also put pressure on developing
countries to enact tax incentives legislation. They often pitch neighboring countries
against each other and, in order to tip the balance in their favour, they influence
countries

to

grant

endless

tax

incentives

despite

their

well-documented

shortcomings.65
Tax sparing is the term given to a situation where one country, the host country,
provides tax incentives for businesses to be established there, and the home country
gives a tax credit or exemption for income that would have been taxed at the normal
rate in the host country but for the existence of the tax incentives. The effect is that
the ‘spared taxes’ are treated by the home country as having been paid. Kim Brooks
claims that for tax incentives given to a capital-exporting country to be meaningful, a
tax sparing provision is needed in the tax treaty between both countries.66 She
maintains that tax sparing provisions are more important to foreign investors whose
home countries do not exempt the business income of foreign subsidiaries of their
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corporations, such as the United States, but instead, operate a “gross up and credit
system.”67 In this case, the United States provides a tax credit for those foreign taxes
paid when such are repatriated, usually in the form of a dividend. This tax is deferred
in the United States until the income is repatriated, which could be into perpetuity.
Alternatively, the tax-liable entity may opt to repatriate its foreign profits through a
third country that serves as a conduit and which does not tax the income.
Clearly, the reasons home countries agree to tax sparing arrangements are at odds
with inter-nation equity principles. This is because the home country foregoes a
greater share of tax revenue than it would normally be required to lose. Kaufman
argues that the existence of tax sparing arrangements reinforces the notion that the
entitlement theory is not applicable in terms of inter-nation equity. Furthermore, she
sees tax sparing agreements with developing countries as ‘’indicating an acceptance
of a certain degree of redistribution within the international tax system.’’68 It
definitely contradicts the “ability to pay principle”, and the “benefit and economic
allegiance” approaches.69 It is evidence of developed countries wanting to assist
developing countries by encouraging businesses to expand at the cost of accepting
less revenue.
The main beneficiaries from tax sparing agreements are the MNEs that establish
business operations in developing countries that provide tax incentives.70 From an
equity perspective, tax sparing contradicts notions of horizontal equity and internation equity.71 The reason developing states prefer fiscal incentives is because they
serve to reduce the burden on investment undertakings, and as a means to induce
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foreign investment in specific sectors or locations of an economy.72 But given its
operation and outcome, as earlier indicated from the literature, the ultimate
beneficiary of incentives and tax sparing treaty provisions are investors and home
countries, not the host developing countries.
2.6 Factors Influencing Investment Decisions in Developing Countries
In the end, it is left to point out the factors that persuade investment in poor
economies. In general, the literature points to non-tax and tax factors. Tax incentives
provide indirect support in the form of tax breaks, lower tariffs, etc. Non-tax
incentives offer direct support in the form of structural facilities. They include market
size; access to raw materials; effective, transparent and accountable public
administration; language and cultural conditions; adequate legal, financial, physical
and institutional infrastructure; availability and cost of skilled labour; access to
infrastructure; transportation costs; political stability; consistent and stable macroeconomic and fiscal policy (foreign exchange); and financing costs. Transparency and
fairness in the decision-making system, another major investment-attracting factor, is
a major challenge for most developing countries.73 This is because their absence
induces corruption and rent-seeking behaviour. This reality undermines the prospect
for simplicity and certainty in the application of tax law and tax administration, and
adversely influences what general level of taxation prevails and how tax incentives
may be applied. It is into this uneasy situation that, as the literature discloses, tax
incentives operate rather unprofitably for developing country economies.
2.7 Conclusion
Overall, the most important conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that, although
tax incentives are often used in an effort to attract foreign direct investment in
72
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developing countries, they do not guarantee adequate benefits for host countries.
Although as a general matter this review of the literature suggests that tax incentives
are an ineffective method for attracting investment, there appears to be a shift among
tax advisers. They no longer recommend against the use of tax incentives. Rather,
they offer assistance to improve the use and design of tax incentive regimes74 so as to
avoid taxpayer abuse and erosion of the revenue base of capital-importing countries.
They do this because many countries persist in offering tax incentives, particularly the
developing states.
With this in mind, the next chapter looks at the global initiatives to counter harmful
tax practices. The expectation is that when the relevant features are incorporated into
legislation and treaties, and notionally and comparatively applied and administered,
perhaps tax incentives begin to be less of economic and fiscal liabilities to capitalimporting states, especially the developing ones, than they have been so far.
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CHAPTER THREE
Global Initiatives on Harmful Tax Practices
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 explained the general principles of taxation and emphasized the need for
countries to institutionalize good tax policy regimes. It established that a good tax
policy is marked, among others, by principles of equity, neutrality, competitiveness,
including administrability. The value of the analysis is the conclusion that a
jurisdiction that operates its tax regime by these principles minimizes the chances for
tax avoidance and evasion. Chapter 2 provided a review of the relevant literature to
arrive at the conclusion that tax incentives are ineffective as a means of attracting
foreign investment, despite their widespread use. This chapter discusses the various
global efforts designed to curb nations’ vulnerability to tax evasion and avoidance,
especially targeting the evasion and avoidance opportunities presented by rampant use
of tax incentives.1
3.2 Why Counter Harmful Tax Practices
One economic rationale for fighting harmful tax practices (HTP) is to prevent the
avoidance of the implementation of residence based taxation, contrary to the principle
of capital export neutrality,2 unless domestic tax authorities have information on
revenues generated abroad.
Capital Export Neutrality can only be achieved if an investor from a specific country
faces the same rate of return on their investment irrespective of location. 3As well, it
must be noted that the removal of trade barriers, technological progress and financial
1
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integration, which now combine to allow “banking without borders,”4 have caused an
increase in the mobility of tax bases, particularly capital. Indeed, the removal of trade
barriers has led to the creation of new opportunities, opened new frontiers, provided
greater choices for consumers, and led to increased competition and taxation
challenges. One of the challenges a government faces is to keep its tax system
competitive. It is to facilitate this concern and to curb harmful tax practices that the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has put forward
the suggestions discussed below.
The OECD, in response to the prevalence of harmful tax practices around the world,
approved a report in 2006. The aim of that report was to create an environment in
which all countries, large and small, OECD and non-OECD, whether or not they have
an income tax base, can compete freely and fairly. 5 To this end, the two elements of
transparency and cooperation achieved through effective exchange of information are
important to the outcome of implementing the report’s suggestions.6
The OECD’s effort speaks to the importance of the situation. Initially, the effort met
with stiff opposition. The United States was particularly vocal that no organization
could prescribe the appropriate level of taxation, or dictate the design of any country’s
tax system. However, following the exposure of hundreds of individuals in Germany
evading taxes by using an anonymous Liechtenstein based trust,7 and of tens of
thousands of wealthy Unites States citizens evading taxes ably facilitated by the
Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS),8 erstwhile “uncooperative” tax havens have
4
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become committed to join in the fight against harmful tax practices.9 These events
occurred in a period of severe economic crunch during which governments were
seeking additional revenue to ease economic woes. For this reason, it became clear
that even if tax evasion (tax havens) are not the root causes of financial crises, dealing
with them is, nevertheless, part of the solution.10
3.3 Concept and Features of Harmful Tax Practices Regimes
As indicated, the OECD and, as discussed later, other bodies have assumed leadership
in the effort to curb harmful tax practices. Their efforts in this direction proceed from
identifying what these practices are, along with recommendations as to what can be
done about them.
3.3.1 Concept of Harmful Tax Practices
“Harmful tax practices” (HTP) can be described as the deliberate setting of tax
policies with the intention to attract a mobile tax base, usually in a way that is not
transparent. The goal of the OECD is to reduce the discretionary influence of taxation
on the location of mobile financial and service activities, thereby encouraging an
environment in which free and fair tax competition can take place.11 Its goal is to
secure the integrity of tax systems by addressing the issues raised by regimes that
apply to mobile activities and that unfairly erode the tax bases of other countries,
potentially distorting the location of capital and services.12 If countries or
governments compete with one another in offering incentives, it can lead to a “race to
the bottom.”13 That is why it is preferred for countries to institute agreements among
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themselves to eliminate tax incentives completely, as their cost can be monumental,
especially when compounded with the cost of compliance and enforcement.14
Naturally, the question that arises is why seek such an outcome.

3.3.2 Combating Harmful Tax Practices: Rationale for OECD’s Initiatives
Professors Eden and Kudrle contend that the origins of the OECD’s harmful tax
competition project can be traced to two key actors within the OECD – the United
States and the European Union.15 First, the existence of cross-border financial
transactions through electronic commerce via the Internet and the existence of
offshore financial centres (OFCs) were perceived by the US Government to have the
capacity to erode the tax base unless international cooperation could be obtained.16
Second, as a result of the ‘1992 single common market initiative’ and the removal of
barriers, the European Union became concerned about the effect of different tax rates
among members, especially Ireland.17
Cooperation between OECD member states became crucial to prevent the erosion of
their tax bases. Since the late 1990s, the OECD has been active in trying to identify
and eliminate harmful tax competition. The harmful tax practices project was aimed at
tax havens and OFCs and involved the ‘naming and shaming’ of some 36 tax havens.
Since then, a large number of tax havens have agreed with the OECD to reform their
bank secrecy laws and to become more transparent in their dealings with other
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countries.18 The OECD has been actively trying to protect the national tax bases of its
member states, and this has now become imperative in view of global financial crises
and government deficits. The project, pursued since 1998, appears to be receiving
worldwide acceptance.19 Major tax havens have agreed to comply with the OECD’s
project and to provide details on non-resident taxpayers that use their financial
systems for tax avoidance and tax evasion.20
The reality of global financial crises has pushed the OECD member states to
recognise that the time for action had come and that pressure must be put on
recalcitrant tax havens to make information exchange agreements. The immediate
emphasis is to promote a level playing field by eliminating domestic bank secrecy
laws and concluding agreements which, among OECD member states, must facilitate
information exchange on non-residents using their financial services.21 But to really
accomplish these demands knowing how to identify a harmful tax regime.
3.3.3 Features of Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes
The OECD report outlines four key factors that assist in identifying harmful
preferential tax regimes. These are first, that the country imposes a low or zero
effective tax rate on the relevant income, similar to a tax haven. Second, the tax
regime is ‘ring fenced,’ in that residents of that state do not have access to tax
concessions which are only offered to foreign investors or businesses. Third, there is a
lack of transparency in the tax system; and fourth, there is a lack of effective
exchange of information on investments and bank accounts operated by nonresidents.22
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Beyond the foregoing, the report notes also that a harmful preferential tax regime
exists in the presence of these other factors: first, an artificial definition of the tax base
which may allow some non-resident investors or businesses to obtain certain
exemptions from tax, or receive tax concessions that are not offered to residents and
non-residents in similar circumstances; second, a failure to adhere to international
transfer pricing principles; third, negotiable tax rate or tax base; fourth, secrecy
provisions relating to bank account details or the allowing of bearer shares; and fifth,
the existence of a wide network of taxation treaties between countries which may
allow for abuse through treaty shopping.23
It is no longer news that most nations, irrespective of their stages of development,
have been actively promoting themselves as investment locations of choice in order to
attract foreign direct investment.24 They have adopted several measures as incentives
in support of their investment objectives, including the use of tax incentives.
The United Nations (UN) defines foreign direct investment (FDI) incentives as “any
measurable advantages accorded to specific enterprises or categories of enterprises by
(or at the discretion of) a Government, in order to encourage them to behave in a
certain manner.”25 This includes measures specifically designed to either increase the
rate of return of an FDI enterprise or to reduce its costs and the level of risk it
assumes. The UN also defines tax incentives as “any incentive that reduces the tax
burden of enterprises in order to induce them to invest in particular projects or
sector”.26 The United Nations points out that investors adopt a two-stage process
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when appraising countries as possible investment locations.27 First, countries are
screened for the presence of fundamental determinants28 like access to raw materials
and availability of skilled labour. Only those countries that pass the first stage are
evaluated in terms of tax rates, grants and other incentives. Because tax incentives are
intended to encourage investment in certain sectors or geographical areas, they are
often provided with conditions attached.
Given their potential to facilitate HTPs, the OECD, United Nations (UN) and other
supranational organizations have sought to provide guidance to policymakers29 on
whether to adopt tax incentives and how best to design them. These efforts are now
considered more specifically, first for the OECD, and then the United Nations.
3.4 The International Tax Policy Advisory Bodies: The OECD and The United
Nations
3.4.1The OECD Tax Incentive Initiative
3.4.1.1 The OECD Initiative: The Institutional Concept
The mission of the OECD is to promote policies that will improve the economic and
social well-being of people around the world.30 Its work is based on continued
monitoring of events in member countries, as well as outside the OECD area, and
includes regular projections of short and medium-term economic developments. The
OECD works with governments to understand what drives economic, social and
environmental change.
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The OECD publishes regular outlooks, annual overviews and comparative statistics.
The OECD also co-operates with civil society on a number of levels. Its core
relationship with civil society is through the Business and Industry, and the Trade
Union Advisory Committees, respectively, the BIAC and TUAC.

31

These advisory

bodies contribute to most areas of OECD work through policy dialogue and
consultations. Over the years, this co-operation has been complemented by activities
with other representatives of civil society, such as non-governmental organizations,
think tanks, and academia. The OECD also maintains close relationship with
parliamentarians, notably through its Global Parliamentary Network and longstanding links with the Council of Europe and NATO Parliamentary Assemblies.32
The annual OECD Forum is a global platform for exchange of ideas, sharing
knowledge and building networks that bring together all stakeholders including
government Ministers, representatives of international organizations, and leaders of
business, trade unions and civil society. The OECD Forum is held in conjunction with
the annual ministerial meeting and enables all stakeholders to discuss key issues on
the ministerial agenda with government Ministers and senior officials of international
organizations.
Tax competition has received increased focus. The OECD published its first report on
this matter in 1998.33 The focus of the OECD’s efforts relates to geographically
mobile activities such as financial and other service activities. The 1998 Report
established a number of criteria for determining whether a preferential tax regime was
harmful. OECD member countries that approved the 1998 Report committed to
eliminate any of their preferential tax regimes found to be harmful. In fact, the initial
31
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work focus was (1) to identify and eliminate harmful features of preferential tax
regimes in OECD member countries; (2) to identify “tax havens” and seek their
commitment to the principle of transparency and effective exchange of information;
and (3) to encourage non-OECD economies to associate with the work.34 The OECD
Global Forum on Taxation (The Global Forum) is the committee tasked to engage,
through dialogue, the non-OECD economies on tax issues.
3.4.1.2. Overview of the Initiative
The OECD Model Convention was originally meant to apply between two high–
income countries,35 and so did not explicitly endorse the inclusion of sparing
provisions in tax treaties.36 However, it suggests how to draft such provisions to limit
their scope. It also recommends that treaty partners might consider either exempting
tax income from activities that developing countries seek to encourage, or agreeing to
tax sparing arrangements that would credit the tax amount that would have been paid
had no relief been granted.37 It seems plausible that countries that do not tax foreignearned active business income will not be inclined to have tax sparing provisions. The
truth is that it is irrelevant to them.38 As to crafting the provision, the OECD suggests
that tax sparing should be limited to some business income and not extend to passive
income.39
Following the report on taxation of foreign direct investment,40 the OECD issued a
caveat regarding the need

to reconsider tax sparing provisions because of the
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potential abusive tendencies associated with their use, the concessions granted in
terms of accepting lower tax revenue,41 and the abundant literature pointing to the
ineffectiveness of tax incentives in promoting foreign direct investment.42

It

recommended that tax sparing should only be used in instances where the economic
level of the country conceding it is significantly worse than the OECD country.43
Flowing from these developments, countries like Canada decided not to include tax
sparing provisions in their tax treaties, or, in Canada’s case, when it does, to include a
“sunset clause”.44
3.4.1.3 The Initiative in Detail
The earlier 1998 Report established a number of criteria for determining whether a
jurisdiction has a preferential tax regime that is harmful. The first and also the
gateway criterion for determining whether a regime is preferential is whether it has
“no or low effective tax rate,”45 though this is not a sufficient reason to infer that a
preferential tax regime is harmful. As such, a jurisdiction must satisfy several other
criteria for it to be black–listed. Thus, second, for a regime to be considered
preferential, it must be ring-fenced from the domestic economy. This means that the
regime must be offering some form of tax preference to foreigners that is not available
to domestic investors. The point is that the regime must be preferential in the context
of the application of the general principles of taxation in the relevant country, and not
by way of comparison to the taxation regime of another country. 46 Third, there must
be lack of transparency, which aids foreign taxpayers to evade taxes in their home
41
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country. Fourth, information exchange must be ineffective.

This is because the

decision of a country to prevent access to bank information is likely to adversely
affect tax administration. Effective exchange of information exists where it is possible
to assess the legal and administrative framework on exchange of information and to
have access to information on banking, property ownership, and accounting. 47 A fifth
criterion is that there must be substantial activity to justify taxation in that
jurisdiction.48
3.4.1.4 Specific Elements of the OECD Initiative
The OECD has championed various initiatives to curb harmful tax practices. This
sub-section discusses three specific elements, namely, naming and shaming, countryby-country reporting, and the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project.
Naming and Shaming: Since the early 1990s, the OECD has tried to ‘name and
shame’ tax havens and eliminate competitive tax practices through its harmful tax
competition project. It wanted to achieve a ‘level playing field’ for all nations in this
matter.49 The goal is to ensure that tax havens eliminate their bank secrecy laws and
become more transparent in their dealings with other countries.50
Country-by-country reporting: To boost transparency on the part of multinational
enterprises (MNEs), the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) was
instituted, followed by a release of the standardized electronic format for the
exchange of Country-by-Country (CbC) Reports between jurisdictions. This is based
on Article 6 of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in
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Tax Matters.51 It puts in place the automatic exchange framework for exchanging
Country-by-Country Reports, as contemplated by Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) Action 13.52 This agreement requires MNEs to provide aggregate annual
information in each jurisdiction where they do business, relating to the global
allocation of income and taxes paid, together with other indicators of the location of
economic activity within the MNE group.53 The country-by-country MCAA allows all
signatories to bilaterally and automatically exchange Country-by-Country Reports
with each other as contemplated by Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan. This will help
ensure that tax administrations obtain a complete understanding of how MNEs
structure their operation without compromising the confidentiality of such
information. First exchanges start in 2017-2018 on 2016 information.54
Under the country by country MCAA, the tax administrations located in the region
where a company operates will get aggregate annual information, starting with 2016
accounts relating to the global allocation of income and taxes paid, together with other
indicators of the location of economic activity within a multinational enterprise
group.55 It will also cover information about which entities do business in a particular
jurisdiction and the business activities each entity engages in. 56 The information will
be collected by the country of residence of the parent of the MNE group, and will then
be exchanged in accordance with the agreements.57
The OECD/G20 BEPS Project: The OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
project, or BEPS, is primarily aimed at preventing multinationals from artificially
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moving their profits into lower-tax jurisdictions. Otherwise, the practice erodes the
revenue base of the countries the MNEs operate in.58 The OECD/G20 BEPS Project
set out 15 key actions to reform the international tax framework and ensure that
profits are reported where economic activities are carried out and value created.59
The term, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is used to describe aggressive tax
planning strategies that rely on mismatches and gaps between the tax rules of different
jurisdictions to minimize the corporation tax that is payable overall by either making
tax profits “disappear,” or by shifting profits to low tax operations where there is little
or no genuine activity.60 Consequently, it either makes profits available for tax
purposes, or shifts them to areas experiencing nil or little actual activity where taxes
are minimal. The result is the payment of nil or minimal total corporate taxes.61 BEPS
is of major significance for developing countries due to their heavy reliance on
corporate income tax, particularly from MNEs.62
The final BEPS package was negotiated by OECD members, the G20 and non-OECD
members (including Nigeria) as equal partners.63 The project seeks to strengthen a
global tax system which is believed by some to be inadequate at the moment, and
which had allowed multinational enterprises (MNEs) to reduce their effective tax
rates in jurisdictions that have no corresponding value-creating economic activities as
do their home jurisdictions.64 Addressing base erosion and profit shifting is a key
priority of governments around the globe. Beyond seeking to secure revenues by
realigning taxation with economic activities and value creation, the OECD/G20 BEPS
Project aims to create a single set of consensus-based international tax rules to address
58
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BEPS, and hence to protect tax bases while offering increased certainty and
predictability to taxpayers.65 A key focus of this work is to eliminate double nontaxation. However, in doing so, the idea is that new rules should not result in double
taxation, nor in unwarranted compliance burdens or restrictions on legitimate crossborder activity.66

The BEPS approach focuses on three broad measures: coherence in tax systems
globally; economic substance in cross border dealings; and transparency with respect
to relevant taxpayer data to assist revenue administrations’ tax investigation efforts.67
According to the BEPS report, every country or state is free to design its corporate tax
system, including the taxation rates.68 The report’s recommendation/objective is to
help restore and consolidate taxation rates by ensuring that each country imposes tax
on profits arising from economic activity undertaken within its jurisdiction.69 For
effective tax payment by the multinational organization that avoids taxation by
shifting mobile capital and income to lowly taxed zones, the BEPs report stipulates
guidelines in tax collection to help create regimes to implement them.70
In particular, the mandatory disclosure regime requires taxpayers and promoters to
disclose to tax administrators the usage of schemes presenting particular unusual
features or hallmarks.71 It is impractical for this regime to target every transaction that
may raise tax avoidance concerns. However, hallmarks act as tools to identify features
within the schemes that facilitate tax avoidance. The timely information received on
65
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possible abusive or aggressive tax planning schemes allows tax administrators to
establish early counteraction.72
The BEPS report offers diverse options that allow countries to design systems that
suit their need to obtain early information on abusive and aggressive tax planning
schemes. Tax administrations may use information collected to counter tax avoidance
structures. In ensuring compliance with the tax administration system and legislative
changes, risk assessment and audits of strategic communications by tax administration
are crucial.73
According to the report’s recommendations, countries are at liberty to decide on the
introduction of mandatory disclosure regimes. When a country agrees to adopt the
regime, the recommendations offer the needed flexibility to balance a nation’s quest
for better and timely data regarding a taxpayer, with the ultimate goal to prevent tax
avoidance.74 In fact, the BEPS project is not centered on increasing corporate tax
rates. However, BEPS features when such tax rates are achieved via practices that
artificially isolate a taxable earning from activities that create it. This, in turn,
increases tax disputes.75 The project aims to undermine tax havens by restricting the
use of shell companies to hoard profits offshore and to neutralize schemes that
artificially shift earning and profit offshore.76 It also seeks to enable states to attract
foreign investors that have no plans to enrich themselves at taxpayer’s expense.77
The BEPS report also addresses dangerous tax practices, as they impact negatively on
both multinationals and governments. It is argued that unhealthy tax competition
distorts and introduces imbalance between businesses operating at global and
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domestic levels.78 To survive the competition and attract investors, countries are
forced to employ particular tax policies, including incentives. Tax avoidance by
MNCs leaves citizens with increased tax burdens to support government
expenditure.79 For this reason, economic development in poor and developing
countries is greatly frustrated.
3.4.2 The United Nations
For its part, the United Nations emphasizes that a government in the process of
developing an incentive system should list and analyze the market imperfections that
the incentives are designed to reduce or eliminate.80 It advocates for a periodic
review of an incentive regime with the goal to prevent revenue leakages by
eliminating excess of incentives, or to update incentive packages to provide real value
to investors and, thus, to attract more investment.81
In terms of preserving tax incentives, a United Nations model treaty was designed to
be more favourable to low-income countries.82 But the treaty makes no express
provision for tax sparing. This absence was interpreted as either suggestive of a
continued bias in favour of high income countries, or a neglect of the distinct needs of
low income countries.83 The closest the UN model treaty came to endorsing tax
sparing provisions was to state that a tax sparing credit is needed to preserve tax
incentives and concessions granted by developing countries.84 According to the
United Nations, the argument as to the cost effectiveness of using tax incentives is not
conclusive because it is difficult to determine the quantum of investment that can be
78
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traced to the use of tax benefits. Moreover, tax incentives are often used with other
reforms, and this makes it more difficult to estimate the new investment attributable to
tax benefits.85 But the UN agrees that certain well-designed tax incentives could be
successful in attracting and increasing investments if properly designed.86 Thus, it
proposes the use of tax incentive budgets and general tax expenditure analysis to
promote accountability and transparency of tax incentives.87 This is in addition to its
inclusion in the formal tax expenditure budget.
Commenting on the UN initiatives, Eric Zolt submits that the design and effectiveness
of tax incentives will differ depending on the type of investment in question.88 Some
of these features speak to eligibility issues. Since tax incentives are departures from
the norm, a special tax privilege should only be available in the case of those desirable
investments that would not be made without the tax benefits.89
3.5 Overview and Conclusion
The foregoing discussion establishes that tax avoidance, and the use of tax incentives
to attract foreign direct investment into developing countries, constitute anticompetitive tax structures. Together, the jurisdictions that facilitate them constitute
tax havens. In terms of the global economy, the existence of such havens not only
erodes the tax bases of the havens themselves; they also facilitate revenue loss by
jurisdictions whose taxation efforts they undermine.
This global adversity, in the face of global economic and financial difficulties,
necessitates cooperative efforts to reverse harmful tax practices problems. As
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discussed, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
the United Nations (UN) have been instrumental in seeking solutions to this common
problem. Between them, they emphasize the need for agreements to facilitate
information exchange regarding banking and efforts to eliminate banking secrecy
laws. The more detailed OECD Initiative is distinguished by being open to nonOECD states, including, as noted, their participation in the projects.
Those recommendations are forthright about what must be done. Starting from the
moral strategy of “naming and shaming” tax havens, they further seek to encourage
country-by-country reporting and information exchange to promote transparency and
cooperation in inter-state taxation administration and enforcement. More broadly and
in greater detail, its design of the base erosion and profit shifting project with action
steps is intended to institutionalize a global tax regime which structures national tax
administration on policies and principles common to all participants with the ultimate
objective that both low and high-income jurisdictions would derive due and legitimate
tax income, particularly from the activities of MNEs irrespective of which jurisdiction
they operate in around the globe.
The functioning of this regime on the basis of treaties that do not allow or facilitate
treaty shopping would benefit jurisdictions like Nigeria. Given that Nigeria and other
developing states are particularly tied to the use of tax incentives to attract investment,
the OECD and the United Nations’ recommendations on how to design an incentive
system to undercut harmful tax practices is particularly useful to consider. This is the
focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Considerations for Designing, Granting and Monitoring Tax Incentive Programs
4.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters established a number of fundamental points that are crucial to
the operation of a national taxation regime that must generate sufficient national
revenue from taxation administration to fund public services and finance the provision
of public facilities. This is the ultimate goal for tax reform for Nigeria.
So far, this thesis has established that the point of departure is an effective tax policy.
The policy must ensure transparency and fairness in taxation among different
economic brackets of taxpayers. As well, tax administration must be efficient in the
sense that the cost of tax liability enforcement must be effective as against revenue
realized. Second, tax legislation must not foster harmful tax practices. More
specifically, the need of developing states like Nigeria to attract foreign direct
investment via provision of incentive regimes must not be allowed to undermine the
requisite revenue that the nation must derive from investors that may benefit from the
implementation of such schemes.
Thirdly, it was shown that not only do incentive regimes do not necessarily promote
investment, additionally, they result in promoting the loss of revenue to jurisdictions
other than those that provide the incentives. This is because the corporate entities that
take advantage of the incentive schemes, particularly MNEs, organize their operations
to transfer earnings to low or no tax jurisdictions from higher tax ones where,
otherwise, they are liable to taxation on their activities. It was discussed that the
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international concern this has raised for financial accountability and fairness in tax
competitiveness among states prompted initiatives like those by the OECD and the
UN discussed in Chapter 3. The goal of those initiatives is to ensure that jurisdictions
that choose to provide tax incentive schemes to attract investment do so according to
criteria that are internationally acceptable. In meeting the criteria, it must ensure that
harmful tax practices, in particular, the creation of tax havens and structures that
encourage tax avoidance and evasion, are minimized among states, or more hopefully,
eliminated totally.
Building on the preceding chapters, this chapter discusses in detail the guidelines that
a state could utilize to design an effective tax incentive regime. It discusses four broad
steps for this process, namely, the designing of the incentive itself; the process of
granting the incentives; the implementation of the conditions under which the
incentives are granted; and follow up of compliance with the terms of the incentive.1
The discussion is laid out as follows: regarding the design of the incentives, section
4.2 demonstrates that this exercise should take into account the specific type of
investment being targeted and for which the investment is meant. Additionally,
countries must limit the duration of tax incentives to reduce the potential costs of
unsuccessful or poorly designed incentive programs. As well, the incentive structure
they put in place must include sunset and anti-abuse clauses, and the option of a
regional approach to granting incentives. Section 4.3 argues that the investors and
other companies that benefit from the incentives must be qualified. Also, the officials
who administer the incentives must be professionals knowledgeable in such
disciplines as accounting and economics, disciplines that are germane to the sector.
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Again, there must be a balance between discretionary and non-discretionary
approaches to granting incentives by the officials to ensure a creative application of
the rules. Section 4.4 turns to the implementation of the incentive conditions. As
shown, this lays upon the national tax administration the need to ensure the audit of
these companies even during the tax holiday period. Section 4.5 describes how
compliance with incentive terms are monitored and evaluated. It emphasizes that this
requires administrators to enforce and closely monitor incentive compliance to make
sure that investors pursue the approved projects that qualify them for the incentive.
Section 4.6 concludes that enforcement and monitoring are crucial to realizing the
benefits expected from tax incentive schemes, a prospect which is a challenge to most
developing countries.2 Indeed, it cannot be over-emphasized that a well thought
incentive scheme can be misdirected if it is not well monitored.

4.2 Incentive Design
Before offering design details, it is useful to reiterate the basic challenges that
incentive schemes pose to the jurisdictions that grant them. To start with, it should be
noted that the granting of tax holidays to new firms which qualify under statutory
criteria without distinguishing between pioneer and established businesses is not
desirable.3 According to Alex Easson, tax incentives are bad in theory and practice
because they are often unproductive and prone to exploitation.4 Kim Brooks argues
that low income countries must desist from granting tax incentives because they
promote remittances rather than reinvestment,5 and they do not offer suitably designed
approaches by which to improve social and economic circumstances in developing
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countries.6 She is particularly strident that a multinational enterprise (MNE) from a
resident country using worldwide taxation will not be able to take advantage of this
incentive outside the regulatory regime of a tax treaty between both contracting states.
This is why the scheme brings an unnecessary loss to the low- income country.7 In the
other words, tax incentives may indicate a good intention but lead to a bad result.8
This is because the multinationals end up not paying taxes in the capital importing
countries and may not even pay in their resident countries.9 In the end, the beneficiary
is not the host state but the multinational.10 The issue to address, therefore, is how
design elements can assembled to minimize the exposure of an incentive-granting
jurisdiction to the extremes of these dangers.
4.2.1 Tax Incentives Should Be Narrowly Targeted
In designing a tax incentive under an investment treaty between states, the first
concern is to determine the types of investment that the incentives are intended to
attract.11 This helps ensure that the incentives are tailored toward the types of
investment identified. It also reduces costs that may be incurred through other
needless, generally targeted incentives.12 To this end, it is necessary to clearly spell
out in detail the applicable qualifying criteria that enable an investor to benefit from
each incentive. Consequently, the incentives offered must be narrowly targeted (with
one particular proposed investment in mind) and, thus, de-emphasize generally
targeted beneficiaries (all new investments, foreign or domestic). 13
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One disadvantage of the selective approach is that the more precisely an incentive
granted is, the greater the distortion it creates. This distortion can take the form of a
company changing its investment decisions to take advantage of incentives, a step that
results in the misallocation of resources.14 Competition may also be distorted between
the firms that may enjoy the incentives and those that do not.15 Therefore, the better
approach is to bring the corporate tax regime closer to international practices, rather
than grant favourable tax treatment to specific investors.16 For instance, according to
Kim Brooks, an incentive should not be extended to tax expenditures that relate to
passive income. It should be restricted to business income excluding returns from
exploration activities which already have high economic rent.17
An effective incentive design should also include three inter-related features. The first
is reciprocity, meaning that the incentive should only be provided via tax treaties
between high and low-income countries, and they should not be reciprocal. The
second is restrictiveness. This is because the recent trend suggests that it is less
cumbersome to extend such benefits to only corporate taxpayers. The rationale is to
check possible abuse on a larger scale and to enhance auditing. Third, the scheme
must enhance specificity, meaning that the benefit in view should be specifically
targeted to a particular activity and not to a wide range of tax incentive provisions.18
4.2.2 Sunset Clauses under an Incentive Scheme
Another important feature of incentive design is the need to limit its duration in order
to reduce the potential costs of an unsuccessful or poorly designed incentive program.
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To do this requires including specific sunset provisions19 in the original legislation.20
Incentive regimes must demand information reporting by beneficiaries to investment
agencies, and to specify what government agency has responsibility for monitoring
and enforcing qualification and recapture provisions.21
The use of sunset clauses is becoming prominent in treaties.22 The clause is intended
to restrict the ability of investors to benefit indefinitely by imposing some time
restrictions. An instance of such restriction is if a circumstance has changed, such as
when a once low-income country advances to a middle-income status.23 However, this
still does not completely eliminate perverse incentives.
Without the introduction of a sunset provision, taxpayers can benefit from the
incentive as long as the treaty is in force. The sunset provision can be instituted once a
treaty is signed or when it comes into force. One likely effect of this is that it creates
an incentive for a taxpayer to quickly repatriate profit.24
Another sunset approach is to limit how long a particular taxpayer may have a right to
benefit from the tax incentive. The time duration motivates the setting up of new
companies, or deploying transfer pricing to move profits between associated
companies,25 a situation that blurs the line between new investment and reinvestment. It is recommended that for the sake of simplicity, parties should be able to
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terminate an incentive within a reasonable time without having to renegotiate the
treaty.26
4.2.3 Anti-abuse Clauses and Reporting Requirements
It is also recommended that anti-abuse clauses be included to prevent treaty abuse. As
well, high-income countries must report on their use of incentives in tax expenditure
accounts. It behooves the foreign investor to provide its resident government with an
annual report of qualifying activities and reliefs.27
4.2.4 Regional Approaches to Harmonisation
Because incentives affect the tax income of other states, it is important in the context
of cooperation, that countries agree on a set of tax incentives that may be offered to
investors. This situation requires individual countries to meet certain guidelines with
respect to those incentives. For example, a group of countries could agree to offer tax
holidays to investors,28 but require that holiday periods should not exceed a certain
length of time, such as three years.29 Countries could also agree to not allow tax
holidays, but allow different types of tax incentives, such as “super” depreciation or
investment tax credits.30 Finally, it is also important in the design of incentives to
consider the tax regimes of other countries from various perspectives: that their
residents may be potential investors; that they are competitors for other foreign
investors; and that their residents may be potential consumers of products produced in
the incentive-granting country.31 With these in mind, the scheme must account for its
impact, positive or negative, on the functional effect of those factors once it comes
into operation.
26
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4.3 Granting Incentives
4.3.1 Employment of Professionals.
The next step after incentive design is what considerations should inform its grant to
entities that may benefit from the incentive. In this respect, it is important to establish
the revenue foregone in the light of the benefits to be derived. 32 Revenue foregone,
according to Alex Easson, includes revenue not received from projects that would
have been undertaken even if the investor did not receive any tax incentives; lost
revenue from investors who had improperly claimed the incentive; additional revenue
loss due to taxpayer abuse through disguising illegitimate operations to qualify for
tax benefits, a ploy that also includes allocation of resources or too much investment
in certain activities to the detriment of other non-tax favoured areas; and the cost
associated with monitoring and enforcing compliance, coupled with opportunities for
corruption where officials carry much discretion in granting tax incentives.33 The
greater the complexity of the tax incentive regime, the higher the enforcement and
compliance cost.34 Hence, the professional qualifications of officers given the
responsibility to review incentive applications must include extensive background in
social sciences, especially accounting and economics. In the case of Nigeria, where
about 12.6% of its workforce are professionals who are not regularly trained, and the
rest being support staff, the prospect of putting together that calibre of tax incentive
administrators is daunting.35
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4.3.2 Review of the Incentive-granting Process
There is need to reduce administrative discretion in the incentive-granting process.
Leaving it to officials to grant tax incentives could lead to abuse. In the case of
Nigeria where corruption is pervasive, discretion in this process must be curtailed.36 If
not, it is highly possible that officials may collude with investors so that incentives
would be granted to those that may not qualify for them, but who would make money
by coming under them. In such situations, the officials would receive their kickbacks,
leaving state coffers bereft of revenue that should otherwise be collected.
4.4 Implementing Incentive Conditions37
4.4.1 Auditing Companies Under Tax Holiday and The Use of Tax Credits
Account
A basic implementation condition is auditing. Entities that enjoy an incentive like a
tax holiday must still file tax returns even during the tax holiday. Alex Easson
maintains that if no tax return is filed during the holiday period, this may give rise to
tax avoidance and abuse, especially if the enterprise is allowed to carry forward losses
incurred during the holiday period.38
Vito Tanzi & Howell Lee propose that companies enjoying tax holidays should still
file tax returns. In their opinion, this will go a long way to help tax authorities to
determine with greater certainty the revenue cost of tax incentives. 39 They consider it
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improper to argue that if no tax is payable during the holiday period, then no
formalities are required. The tax credits account provides transparency and certainty
to government and the potential investor.40 It is a hybrid of tax holiday and investment
tax credit. When complied with, the cost of the incentive to the host government is
known, and it removes any built-in advantage for those investments that make quick
profits.41 Essentially, the tax credit account resembles an investment tax credit
because the credit amount is a fixed sum that is not determined by the amount of the
investment. Consequently, it does not provide a preference to capital-intensive
investments

42

over those that are not, and, therefore, it should be transparently

accounted for.
4.4.2 Transparency in granting tax incentives
Transparency seeks to equalize and ensure fairness among incentive beneficiaries.
This condition must be observed by the state in its administration of the incentive
scheme. Doing this can assume legal and regulatory, economic and administrative
dimensions.43 The legal dimension speaks to the need for tax incentives to have a
statutory basis in the relevant tax law. The economic dimension is to the effect that
the rationale for granting incentives be clearly set forth in terms of the costs and
benefits of a proposed incentive, along with clarity about the assumptions and
methodology that inform its determination. The administrative dimension demands
that the qualifying criteria must be simple, specific and objective so as to minimize
the discretion afforded officials who grant the incentives.44
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4.4.3 Set up a Tax Incentive Budget
Another implementation condition the state must assess is goal congruence between
tax authorities and the department in charge of foreign direct investment (FDI).
Clearly, the deliverable for the department in charge of FDI is to attract foreign
investment. Its concern is less in regard to protecting the tax base, and so it tends to
hand out incentives without determining whether they are necessary.45Alex Easson
suggests the need for agreement between tax authorities and these foreign investment
agencies on both a target amount and a methodology for determining the revenue
costs associated with the incentives.46
4.4.4 Undue Emphasis on “large investment”
Again, for the state to impose a dollar threshold for foreign investment can also be
distorting, apart from the fact that it crowds out domestic investors because they are
highly unlikely to be able to raise the qualifying threshold revenue.47 The way around
this is for an interested investor to alter the source of financing of its investment, or
even to inflate the value of the assets it contributes to meet this qualification
requirement.48 Consequently, the project may fail or under-perform for reasons rooted
in how this qualifying requirement is satisfied by the investor.
4.4.5 Unrestrained Use of Tax Holidays
Another factor that the state must implement carefully is how investors use tax
holidays as an incentive. To protect against abuse, policy-makers could tie tax
incentives directly to employment. They could demand the creation of a stipulated
number of jobs as a condition for qualifying for the tax holiday or other incentives.49
In rank, a tax holiday is often viewed as the most expensive incentive, followed by
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investment allowance and then accelerated depreciation.50 The appeal of investment
allowance and tax credit is that the revenue cost is directly related to the amount of
investment, and so their maximum cost is more easily estimated.51
Scholars have argued against the reckless use of tax holidays. They concede that
granting tax holidays without thinking about the potential profit at stake is
unscrupulous. They point out that sometimes investors believe their investment will
earn above market returns and, if a tax holiday is still granted for their type of
investment, it amounts to a loss of revenue without any benefits to the state.52 The
fact is that investors would still have invested even without a tax incentive in view of
the potential of above market returns. But it is also admitted that short tax holidays are
not desirable; they are of limited value or interest to potential investors who want to
embark on substantial investments in regard to which it will take several years before
they break even, and by the time the investment may become profitable, the holiday
period is over.53 For this reason, it is advised that short-term tax holidays are more
applicable to highly mobile sectors, such as export–oriented businesses like textiles
production, which are expected to show quick profits. The idea is that short-term tax
holidays will attract “foot-loose” projects.54
4.4.6 No segregation Between Foreign and Domestic Investors
A final factor in considering incentive implementation relates to the place of national
or domestic investors. These investors do not have much reason to invest elsewhere,
and so it can be argued that only foreign investors need incentives. Therefore,
restricting tax incentives to only foreign investors seems justifiable on the ground that
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it reduces potential revenue loss.55 The flip side is that it becomes discriminatory.
Apart from causing resentment, it can also be ineffective because domestic investors
may resort to self-help in the form of “round tripping,” that is, they may disguise
domestic investment as coming from foreign sources.56

Obviously, effective

implementation of an incentive system must find ways around this problem. Some
solutions suggested are that it is better to incentivize all investors or reduce the
general taxation rate.57
4.5 Ensuring Compliance with Incentive Terms
The creation and implementation of an incentive regime comes full circle with
enforcing and monitoring compliance with its requirements. The broad need for
monitoring and enforcement is, in this regard, set against paying due regard to the
impacts of implementation of the regime on the revenue of other states, especially
investor home jurisdictions. The issues here are considered accordingly.
4.5.1 Enforcement and Monitoring
The United Nations particularly points to the need for states to follow up on the firms
benefiting from the incentives they offer. It notes that monitoring is particularly weak
in developing countries.58 This means that governments only have data on investment
approvals, but they have no grip on the magnitude of actual investment inflows. In
other words, foreign investors agree to government dictates in order to obtain
investment licenses and incentives, but end up pursuing the approved project as they
like,59 rather than according to the requirements which qualified them for the
incentive. Project monitoring is necessary to align this.
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4.5.2 Host States Must Consider Tax Regimes of Investor Home Jurisdictions
To determine whether the tax benefits granted to foreign investors are reduced or
eliminated by taxes imposed by the investor’s country of residence, countries
generally tax their corporate taxpayers on their foreign source income under one of
two alternatives. First is the credit method whereby corporate taxpayers are taxed on
their world-wide income and receive a foreign tax credit against their domestic tax
liability for foreign income taxes paid on the foreign source income. 60 Second is the
exemption method whereby the corporate taxpayers are generally taxed on only their
domestic source income and can exempt certain foreign source income in computing
their tax liability.61 In theory, foreign investors from countries that adopt the credit
method are less likely to benefit from tax incentives as the revenue from the favoured
activities may be effectively transferred to the investors’ revenue service from the tax
authorities in the host country.62
4.6 Conclusion
The four broad steps discussed in this chapter do, indeed, constitute essential elements
for the design and assessment of an effective incentive regime. They ensure that any
jurisdiction that employs tax incentives to attract investment to develop its economy
and employment prospects must think of what sectors to open up for this operation.
As well, the incentive granting process must close opportunities to undermine its
proper application through corruption. In implementing the scheme, the state must
ensure, among others, that beneficiaries are audited and that no loopholes are left for
misrepresenting a qualifying investment. Compliance with the scheme must be
ensured not only by requiring clear accounting for the revenue “gained” by the
investors as its incentive. As well, the impact on the tax arrangement of the investors’
60
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home jurisdictions must be carefully rationalized with enforcement of the incentive
scheme.
The foregoing considerations lay the ground for assessing the operation of Nigeria’s
incentive structure and its functioning. Nigeria, like other developing states, has clung
to seeking to attract foreign investment by extending an array of incentives in major
sectors of its economy. The examination in the next chapter establishes that this tool
has, so far, largely caused Nigeria to remain a tax haven. As well, it has not seen the
investment it has sought through its tax incentive arrangements.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Are Incentives, Corruption, or Poor Monitoring and Enforcement Making
Nigeria a Tax Haven?
5.0 Introduction
This chapter discusses the factors that are responsible for making Nigeria a tax haven.
The discussion relates to various economic sectors. It explores whether loopholes in
tax legislation, corruption, or poor monitoring and enforcement by the federal tax
administration and the judiciary, facilitate the advantage taken by corporations to
avoid or evade tax liability, contrary to the requirements of relevant legislation.
The chapter reviews the Nigerian tax environment, arguing that Nigeria exhibits some
features of a tax haven. Nigerian tax legislation is examined in terms of its
enforcement by the judiciary. This is salient because the authoritative interpretation of
applicable tax requirements informs the attitude of relevant actors toward their tax
liabilities. Following this, the tax incentives program in Nigeria is reviewed in terms
of sectoral investment in four sectors that benefit from it, namely, agriculture, export,
petroleum and manufacturing. The review considers whether thus far, Nigeria has
benefitted from extending tax reliefs to investors. It also assesses how the Nigerian
economy has fared in view of the exemptions.
5.1 Globalization and The Nigerian Economy
Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa.1 The country’s population is estimated at
177 million, with an annual growth rate of more than 3 percent.2 Nigeria has 36 states,
a federal capital territory (Abuja) and 774 local government areas. It has three major
1
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sea ports in Lagos, Warri and Port Harcourt, and 11 international airports. Nigeria’s
main trading partners are the European Union (specifically France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom), the United States, India, the People’s
Republic of China (China) and Brazil.3
The Nigerian economy’s large dependence on oil amidst the failure of the state to earn
its due take through taxation from that sector has a great adverse impact on its
national income.4 This is more so given that over the last decade, Nigeria experienced
remarkable growth in the establishment of multinational enterprises in the oil
industry.5
Globalization has boosted trade and increased the flow of foreign direct investment
into the country. However, this is not without the attendant risk of the impact of crossborder activities on the exercise of Nigeria’s right to tax all economic activities within
or touching its jurisdiction. In this context, the logical question revolves around the
extent to which the relevant tax laws have set the basis for enforcing tax liability, and
what role the judiciary has, or has not played to make effective enforcement a reality.
5.2 A Description of Nigerian Tax Legislation
The various Nigerian governments have, over the years, passed several tax statutes to
authorize raising of revenue to run the state machinery and to provide social services.
The various tax laws in force in Nigeria, contained in the Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria (LFN) 2004, include the Capital Gains Tax Act,6 the Companies Income Tax
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Act,7 the Education Tax Act,8 the Federal Inland Revenue Act,9 the Personal Income
Tax Act,10 the Petroleum Profits Tax Act,11 the Stamp Duties Act,12 and the Value
Added Tax Act.13 To ensure that this legislation is administered properly, the
government has established the Federal Inland Revenue Service, the State Board of
Internal Revenue and the Local Government Revenue Committee as the agencies
responsible for the administration of tax matters at the federal, state and local
government levels respectively.
Like other countries, the Nigerian tax system has a tripartite structure, comprising tax
policy, tax legislation and tax administration. Tax policy is the basis for tax laws,
while tax administration describes its implementation. Consequently, to have an
efficient and effective tax system, appropriate policies must be in place and they must
be well implemented.
Taking the legislation in force individually, the following observations are pertinent.
First, under the Companies Income Tax Act, 2004,14 income tax is imposed on all
corporations registered in Nigeria, or which derive income from Nigeria. These
entities do not include those engaged in petroleum operations. This Act was amended
in 2007 to distinguish between a Nigerian company and a foreign company. The
profits of a non-resident company or a foreign company are taxable in Nigeria to the
extent that they are attributable to operations carried on by a company in Nigeria. Its
7
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profit is determined and taxed in the same manner as that of a resident company.15
The tax rate is 30% and it is applied to the total assessable profit or chargeable profit
of the company.
Second, the Federal Inland Revenue Act empowers the Federal Capital Territory
(FCT) Internal Revenue Service (FCT IRS) to assess and collect taxes from all
persons chargeable with tax in the FCT. This power was historically vested in the
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) by section 2(1) (b) of the Personal Income
Tax Act, 200416 as amended, and the FIRS (Establishment) Act 2007.17
Third, an education tax, under the Education Tax Fund (Amendment) Act, 2003,18
was introduced in Nigeria in 1993 as a form of social obligation on all companies to
support the Nigerian educational system. Education tax is 2% of assessable profit and
is treated as an allowable expense of the company.
Fourth, by the Personal Income (Amendment) Act, Cap P8, 2011,19 personal income
tax is imposed on individuals who are either employed or running their own
businesses under a business name or partnership. The top marginal rate is 25%.
Recent Nigerian tax policy hinged on the need to move away from direct tax to
indirect taxes. Overwhelming evidence, however, supports direct taxation because of
its sustainable nature and, as well, that shifting away from income taxes is likely to
reduce the long-term sustainability of the national revenue stream.20
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Fifth, the Petroleum Profit Tax Act, LFN 2004, c 13,21 imposes tax at a rate of
between 50% and 85% of the profits of corporate entities that derive income from oil
and gas operations. This Act requires all companies engaged in the extraction and
transportation of petroleum products to pay tax. The tax is related to rents, royalties,
margins and profit sharing elements associated with oil mining, prospecting and
exploration leases.22
Sixth, the Capital Gains Tax Act LFN 2004, introduced this type of tax in 1976 at the
rate of 20%. This was reduced to 10% from 1st January 1996, to stimulate activities in
the Nigerian capital market.23 It is imposed on capital gains derived from sales or
other disposal of chargeable assets.
Seventh, the National Information Technology Development Agency Act (NITDA),
authorizes the imposition of a 1% tax on the profit before tax of certain selected
corporate entities. They include telecommunication, internet service providers,
pension managers, banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions with an
annual turnover of 100million Naira (₦) and above.24
Eighth, under the Stamp Duties Act, LFN 2004, c S8, stamp duty is raised by
requiring stamps sold by government to be affixed to certain designated documents,
such as debentures, warrants and conveyance documents.25 This provision was not
actively enforced until 2016, when government has needed to seriously raise money
to cover the deficit in the 2016 budget. The rate on stamp duties varies.
current year’s performance provides little indication of what the tax base will do the following year and
that such uncertainties lead to unpredictable revenues with the potential risk of large budget gaps. 20
Ekeocha Patterson et al, “Revenue Implications of Nigeria’s Tax System” (2012) 2:8 J Econ &
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Ninth and finally, the Value Added Tax Act LFN 2004, c V1, imposes a value added
tax (VAT) on the net sales value of taxable goods and services at the rate of 5%,
except for those goods specifically exempted. This tax came into effect to replace the
repealed sales tax.26
The tax legislation in Nigeria is sometimes not properly drafted leaving room for
various interpretations.27 As well, the tax administration process is weak and highly
vulnerable to tax avoidance schemes.28 In essence, the Nigerian tax regime does not
operate in any way that may remotely reflect any manifestation of the equity principle
of taxation. This is particularly seen in tax legislation enforcement through the courts
which, as discussed next, reinforces ineffectiveness in tax administration.
5.3 The Nigerian Judiciary and Tax Enforcement
The Nigerian judicial system has shaped tax policy through the operation of judicial
precedent and stare decisis. Five cases highlight the impact of the Nigerian judiciary
on assessing taxable income. Essentially, these cases show that Nigerian courts are
not a strong ally when it comes to enforcing legitimate tax obligations.
The first illustrative case is Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria v.
Federal Board of Inland Revenue (FBIR).29 In this case, the Supreme Court
unanimously allowed an appeal by Shell against FBIR with respect to the treatment of
“exchange losses” which Shell claimed as a tax deductible item in computing
chargeable tax under the Petroleum Profits Tax Act, PPTA. FBIR disallowed the
claim. The Supreme Court based its decision on four agreements entered into by
Shell and the FBIR between 1967 and 1972, which required the oil company to pay
26
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tax, in pound sterling, into the Central Bank of Nigeria’s account in London. The
court’s decision adversely impacted the efficacy of Nigerian tax law, in particular, as
to what constitutes taxable income under PPTA.
In Marina Nominees Limited v. Federal Board of Inland Revenue,30 the appellant was
a partnership which incorporated a company to perform secretarial functions which it
had previously performed. It did this in a bid to reduce its tax burden. When the agent
company was faced with assessment for tax purposes, the appellant, as principal,
challenged the assessment by claiming that as an agent, the incorporated company
was not subject to tax for tasks performed for it. At the Supreme Court, it was held
that using an incorporated company for the purpose of performing a task does not
obviate the fact that the incorporated company is a separate legal entity which must
fulfill its own obligations under the law, including the obligation to pay tax.
The device of incorporating a company was clearly a means to avoid tax, as it would
mitigate the tax burden of the partnership. To combat such situations, the provisions
of section 19 of the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA) LFN 2004, empower the
revenue authority to deem and/or treat the undistributed profit of a company that is
controlled by five persons or less as distributed where its distribution will not be
detrimental to the company. Again, to the extent that the tax agency would diligently
investigate and uncover the use of such tax avoidance devices, it is possible for the
state to receive its due in tax entitlement in situations of this nature.
Third, in Stabilini Visioni Ltd v FBIR,31 an appeal was taken against the ruling of the
Value Added Tax Tribunal. The question before the appellate court pertained to the
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constitutionality of the provisions of section 20 of the Value Added Tax Act, 32 which
established the now defunct Value Added Tax Tribunal. The appellant’s claim was
that the section radically violates the provisions of section 251 of the Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, which vested exclusive jurisdiction in the
Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agents
was a party and prayed the court to dismiss the suit on the ground that the Tribunal
lacked jurisdiction to hear it. After considering the relevant provisions, the court
granted the prayer of the appellant. With regards to the constitutionality of the Value
Added Tax Act 1993 and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it held that the respondent’s
position was inconsistent with the Constitution and so declared the Act null and
void.33 However, by virtue of the provisions of the Federal Inland Revenue Service
(Establishment) Act 2007, which abolished the VAT Tribunal and established the Tax
Appeal Tribunal (TAT),34 the legal quandary in which the VAT Tribunal was placed
has been addressed.
The fourth illustrative case is Lagos State Board of Internal Revenue v Eko Hotels Ltd
& Anor.35 One of the issues for determination was whether the judge of the Federal
High Court was right when he held that the Value Added Tax (VAT) imposed by
Lagos State was unconstitutional, and that Eko Hotels Ltd is a remitting agent to only
the Federal Board of Inland Revenue in respect of tax on sales to its customers, and
that it would amount to double taxation to require the Respondent to yield to the
demands of both the Federal Board of Inland Revenue and the Lagos State Board of
Internal Revenue. The core of the court’s decision was that VAT and sales tax are the
32
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same. VAT is ordinarily a national tax on sales of goods and services. With reference
to whether the provisions of the VAT Act and Sales Tax Law create double taxation,
the court held in the affirmative. It reasoned that the actual burden of the VAT/Sales
tax falls on the consumer and the tax is charged on similar consumable items as
defined in the schedules of both the VAT Act and the Lagos State Sales Law.
Value Added Tax is neither on the Exclusive nor Concurrent Legislative Lists
contained in the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. This means that VAT is a
residual matter. The import of this decision on the Nigerian tax system is that while
the House of Assembly of a State may legislate in the residual field, where the
National Assembly has already legislated on an item, the law passed by the House
Assembly is null and void because the “field” in question has already been
“covered.”36
Finally, in Haliburton (WA) Limited vs. Federal Board of Inland Revenue [2009],37
the extent of the powers of the Federal Board of Inland Revenue was put to test. An
additional assessment arose from contract transactions between the respondent,
Haliburton (WA) Limited, a non-resident company incorporated in the Cayman
Islands, and its affiliate operating in Nigeria under the entity called Haliburton Energy
Services Nigeria Limited (HESNL). It was agreed between the respondent and
HESNL that the respondent would obtain contracts from third parties in Nigeria for
execution by HESNL, with billing for the contract made in United States dollars
(USD). It was the income in USD derived by the respondent from the service
rendered by HESNL to third parties that the appellant, Nigeria’s Federal Board of
36
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Inland Revenue (FBIR) taxed additionally in 2002 to the tune of US$6,972,248 for
the years 1996 – 1999. This brought the dispute to the Federal Court of Appeal.
The appeal rested on the fact that the appellant, the Federal Board of Inland Revenue
(FBIR), made the additional assessment for the 1996-1999 tax years. The respondent
sought to set aside the judgement and for a declaration that the said additional
assessment was invalid, null and void, and to direct the appellant to refund the sum
with interest.
In resolving the dispute, the court held that the working arrangement between the
appellant and HESNL was illegal in that the division of the contract sum between the
respondent and HESNL on turnover was not incorporated in the main contract
between all the parties to that contract. This is because the foreign company, though
not registered in Nigeria, is deemed to have generated income in Nigeria by the
transaction done in Nigeria. The tax authority was concerned, essentially, with and
targeted only the income made or deemed to be made on Nigerian soil from any
transaction conducted within Nigeria, as was the case here.
Utilizing the concept of legitimate expectation,38 the respondent found substantive
grounds to argue that the impact of the clear words of section 26 of the Companies
Income Tax Act (CITA)39 is to override all other provisions of CITA. Specifically,
that Section 26 of CITA overrides other provisions by virtue of the phrase
‘’notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act’’ used in the opening and closing
parts of the section.
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The court concluded that since HESNL is a subsidiary or an affiliate of the
respondent, by making the additional assessment to tax on the undeclared income of
the respondent, which was subsequently discovered by the appellant in the course of
an audit, the appellant cannot be accused of revisiting or taxing over again the initial
declared income that was taxed earlier, as to amount to double taxation. It was agreed
that what the appellant assessed to tax was the income omitted to be declared to the
appellant by the respondent in the original assessment submitted by the respondent. In
the absence of full disclosure by the cross appellant in the first exercise, the cross
appellant cannot benefit from the doctrine of legitimate expectation which is rooted in
utmost good faith on the part of stakeholders, in this case, the appellants.
This case raises a glimmer of hope that some Nigerian judges are bold enough to
check tax avoidance. The court’s treatment of the matter raises the issue of
interpretation of tax laws: whether they should be construed narrowly or strictly. The
attitude of the Nigerian courts is that one has to look merely at what is clearly said,
and that there is no room for any analysis based on intention or purpose. There is no
equity about a tax nor any presumption about it. Nothing is to be read in and nothing
is to be implied; one can only look fairly at the language used. This literal view may,
in the end, not help the state achieve its tax policy objectives, and, therefore, may not
be helpful in the fight against tax avoidance in Nigeria. It also raises other challenges
when Nigeria’s economy is considered within the global context, including the
challenge to fashion a global tax regime to curb, among others, tax avoidance.
In summary, the most forceful observation that can be made is that while they uphold
the law, the Nigerian courts do not seem to appreciate the ultimate objective of tax
legislation. Nor do they demonstrate an appreciation for the skillfulness of tax
avoiders, including their determination to utilize the courts to interpret extant tax rules
[87]

to favour their tax liability preferences.40 The various tax authorities themselves do
not measure up in all key indicators and performance outcomes, including efficiency
of tax administration, accountability and transparency, robust taxpayer base, ease of
filing and tax payments, quality of reporting and dispute resolution.41 Though the
world has changed and Nigeria has, so far, enjoyed almost 19 years of unbroken
democratic governance, the tax laws and their administration system have largely
remained unchanged. Laws in effect date back to the period of military rule,42 except
for the 1999 Constitution.43 Laws have been amended on a yearly basis in conjunction
with the annual budget to correct loopholes, but this has given rise to contention in tax
dispute adjudication.44
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Given the ineffectiveness of the enforcement of tax laws, the question arises whether
Nigeria utilizes other tools to push for realizing the objectives it seeks to achieve
through tax administration.
5.4 Other Elements of Tax Policy
Over the years, Nigeria’s governments have resorted to various fiscal commissions
and study groups to fine tune the tax and fiscal regime. It is safe to say that the
determination of the current Nigerian government to curtail tax avoidance (and
general corruption) is partly shaped by the cumulative impact of the studies and
commission reports.
Another instrument of tax policy is the budget. This tool is used to indicate the policy
direction of the government with the endorsement of the legislature via its passage of
the budget bill into law in the form of an Appropriation Act.45 Needless to point out,
the government expresses the need and intention to curb tax avoidance through this
Act.
It must be highlighted that the various income tax laws have always contained
provisions enabling the government to enter into treaties and/or agreements with
foreign governments/entities, and to make regulations necessary to give effect to the
treaties and/or agreements. The considerations for entering into a treaty relationship
are determined by the general economic objectives of the state. Since Nigeria has
always desired to attract foreign investment, it seeks to remove restrictions and
disincentives to business. As discussed in chapter three, one major policy instrument
in this regard is avoidance of double taxation agreements (ADTAs).46 ADTAs are
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reciprocal arrangements where two countries agree to relieve or reduce the tax
liability of individuals or companies, so long as there is some connection between the
incomes in each of the countries.47 In theory, ADTAs foster and encourage
international trade and commerce because they are geared toward reducing the cost of
doing business across state borders.
During the colonial era, a number of these agreements were concluded on behalf of
Nigeria by Britain, with such countries as Ghana (1950), Sierra Leone (1950), the
Gambia (1950), New Zealand (1951), Sweden (1954), Demark (1955) and Norway
(1956). All these agreements were repealed by the Federal Military Government on
25 April 1978.48 From 1977 to 2013, Nigeria had comprehensive avoidance of double
taxation agreements in force with the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Canada, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Philippines, Czech Republic
(now called Czechia), Slovakia and China, and an air and shipping only agreement
with Italy.49
Again, the collective utilization of these policy tools has not necessarily made Nigeria
a jurisdiction conscientious about enforcing its tax rules and maximizing its tax
revenue. This is why it is necessary to assess if Nigeria is a jurisdiction that allows tax
evaders and avoiders to operate comfortably.
5.5 The Concept of a Tax Haven
The assessment whether Nigeria is a tax haven must be calibrated against what such a
jurisdiction is, conceptually, their types, and how they may be identified. Following
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this, an assessment of Nigeria’s incentive scheme under which its tax haven status
emerges, is undertaken in section 5.6 onwards.
A tax haven is a country that offers foreign individuals and businesses little or no tax
liability in a politically and economically stable environment. Tax havens also provide
little or no financial information to foreign tax authorities. Individuals and businesses
that do not reside in a tax haven can take advantage of these countries' tax regimes to
avoid paying taxes in their home countries. Tax havens do not require that an
individual reside in, or a business operate out of that country to benefit from its tax
policies.50
Tax havens are sometimes called tax shelters, secrecy jurisdictions, international
financial centres, or simply offshore financial centres (OFCs). It may also refer to a
state, country, or territory which maintains a system of financial secrecy that enables
foreign individuals to hide assets or income to avoid or reduce taxes in the home
jurisdiction.51A key feature of tax havens is that they have very strong domestic bank
secrecy laws that prevent bank details from being disclosed unless they relate to
criminal activity.52 It is for this reason that many non-resident taxpayers feel confident
about moving capital and investments to tax havens.
Many developed economies53 provide special tax concessions that, in many instances,
are not transparent, in order to encourage investment. In some instances, the tax
concessions are similar to those offered by tax havens and OFCs. The extent of tax
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hypocrisy54 in the developed world arguably provides tax havens and OFCs with more
than sufficient ammunition to counter any actions to force them out of business by the
OECD or the G20. Even Transparency International alluded to the fact that the
United Kingdom's record was mixed, and concrete action was needed on tax evasion
and secrecy in the wake of the Panama Papers disclosures.55 It also says that there is a
need to stop tainted firms from bidding for public contracts and to protect the
whistleblowers who expose corruption.56
5.5.1 Forms of Tax Havens
Tax havens take a variety of forms. According to Kudrle and Eden,57 there are four
types. The first, a ‘production haven’, is a jurisdiction that grants a tax holiday to
foreign production facilities located there, but still levies an income tax on domestic
corporations and individual residents. Foreign investors are encouraged to produce
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goods or services because of the low taxes and tax concessions offered by the host
country. Ireland was considered a ‘production haven’, as many multi-national
companies set up operations there because of its tax regime. 58 Singapore also offers
very generous tax concessions for businesses to set up production facilities or service
companies.59 Other countries with generous production concessions include India,
Indonesia, China, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Poland and Thailand.60
The second category is a ‘headquarters haven,’ where companies are encouraged to
incorporate, even if shareholding is located elsewhere. Singapore and Belgium are
examples of headquarters havens. The third and most contentious category is the
‘sham haven’61 where the host country imposes little or no income tax on profits
generated by the foreign investor. The offshore financial centre located in the sham
haven provides banking and insurance products for the foreign entity. 62 The best
examples of ‘sham havens’ are the Pacific tax havens, such as Vanuatu, and the
Caribbean tax havens, such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.63 The fourth
category is a ‘secrecy haven’ which ensures that details of monetary transactions are
kept secret from the taxpayer’s home country. The best examples of a ‘secrecy haven’
are Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria and Singapore. In these countries, tax rates are
not as important as the ability to hide investments.64
The OECD has expressed concern with its member countries that have harmful
preferential tax practices with the goal to attract investment and other ‘financial and
58
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geographically mobile activities.’65 One specific area that the OECD is concerned
about is when a country ‘ring fences’ its own residents from taking advantage of
taxation benefits that are only offered to foreign investors that are non-residents. They
are excluded from these benefits by a ‘ring fence’ and so, by definition, is a tax haven
according to the OECD guidelines.66
The OECD claims that preferential tax regimes harm ‘global welfare’. 67 Littlewood
argues there is no supporting evidence for this claim, particularly in terms of
preferential tax regimes. He contends that the only beneficiaries are the G7 countries’
treasuries, while developing countries lose investment capital if they comply with the
OECD guidelines on this matter.68
5.5.2 Identification of Tax Havens: The 1998 OECD Report69
As discussed in chapter three, the 1998 OECD Report identifies two distinct
jurisdictions that threaten the tax bases of the OECD member states. They are tax
havens and countries that have harmful preferential tax regimes but are not tax
havens. These states may or may not belong to the OECD. However, it is of note that
some members of the OECD offer preferential tax treatments to attract investment
capital and other financial service activities, such as Switzerland.
The OECD Report finds it unsatisfactory that some states may impose tax at higher
than normal rates on some income, but no tax on other forms of income. 70 The
progress report issued by the OECD in June 2000 lists 35 countries considered to be
tax havens, and identified 47 potentially harmful preferential tax regimes in OECD
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member countries.71 By 2008, only three countries on the original list of 35 had not
committed to the OECD to effectively exchange information. The three are
Liechtenstein, Monaco and Andorra.72 However, as at 17 April 2009, all three had
pledged to enter into exchange of information agreements. This allowed the OECD to
gain cooperation from all the countries named on the ‘black list’ in the 2000 progress
report.73
In light of the foregoing, the question now is whether the role of incentive programs
and their operation in Nigeria makes it a tax haven. For this purpose, some of
Nigeria’s popular incentives are reviewed to see the extent to which they exhibit
features of a tax haven.
5.6 Role of Incentive Programs in Economic Development in Nigeria
The need for foreign direct investment has always hinged on the expectation of “a
package of cheap capital, advanced technology, superior knowledge of foreign
markets for final products and capital goods, immediate inputs and raw materials,”74
inflow of investment capital and the needed revenue to acquire technical skills. To
appraise Nigeria’s experience in the operation of its investment incentive laws
requires analyzing records of businesses formed under the scheme, the number of
projects approved in its various industries, size of employment generated, and amount
of capital involved. As discussed in chapter two, it is necessary to substantiate the role
played by the incentives and to make a conclusion as to their effectiveness. The
analysis is undertaken against the criteria of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.
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As earlier discussed, a detailed assessment of tax expenditures (TEs) should consider
tax incentives’ effectiveness, distributional effect, and compliance and administrative
costs in relation to possible policy options that could attain the same social and
economic goals.75 Thus, assuming that some investors are sensitive to tax incentives,
it is only proper to estimate the benefits associated with attracting such firms against
the cost of the tax holiday programs offered to them. How do these considerations
find expression under the Nigerian regime?
5.7 Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria
Investment in Nigeria is regulated by the Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission.76 It serves as the regulatory agency for foreign investors operating in the
country as partners with the Nigerian Government and people to develop the Nigerian
economy.
The Minister of Finance and of Industry and Commerce has the authority to examine
and approve new investment projects.77 This relationship is intended to be reciprocal,
not exploitative. The Nigerian Government guarantees security of investment to
encourage investors to discharge their obligations in regard to taxation and corporate
social responsibility, among others.78
Consequently, tax incentives are used to attract, retain or increase investment in
particular sectors to stimulate growth in those areas and to assist companies and
individuals as they set up businesses. In other words, the wisdom of the incentive
regime is to bring about general growth and development across identified sectors and
the economy at large.
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Though the general belief is that tax incentives are desirable to increase foreign direct
investment, the empirical evidence below that measures the relationship between
foreign direct investment and the GDP of Nigeria shows that incentives are not as
valuable to increased investment as they are said to be. The data for discussion are
presented in the graphical table and graph below.
Table 1: Evaluation of FDI in Nigeria in relation to GDP from 1998- 2015 (US$ million)
Year

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

FDI

3.3

2.8

2.5

2.7

3.2

3.0

2.1

4.4

3.3

GDP

32.0

35.9

46.3

44.1

59.1

67.6

87.8

112.2

145.4

Year

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

FDI

3.6

3.9

5.0

1.6

2.1

1.5

1.1

0.8

0.6

GDP

166.4

208.1

169.5

369.1

411.7

460.9

515.0

568.5

481.0

Source: World Bank data catalog: online at datacatalog.worldbank.org
Chart 1: Graph depicting FDI trend in Nigeria in relation to GDP from 1998- 2015

Source: World Bank data catalog: online at datacatalog.worldbank.org
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Graph 2: Graph showing GDP trend with no correlation to FDI from 1998- 2015

Source: World Bank data catalog: online at datacatalog.worldbank.org

The above graphical presentation shows that despite the presence of incentives for all
the periods79 indicated, FDI tends to decline in the year leading to an election and in
this instance for 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014, due to heightened fear of electoral
violence. This points to political turmoil, insecurity, and the uncertainties which
characterize a typical election year in Nigeria. It is also a reflection of the uncertainty
in government policies with the coming of a new administration. A typical fear is that
of expropriation of investment under a new regime. From the foregoing, it can be
safely concluded that incentives are not the main stimulus for FDI inflow into Nigeria.
The urgent message, however, is that Nigeria must work harder on its “investment
climate”80 by, for example, tackling pervasive corruption, inadequate power supply
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and transportation infrastructure, high energy costs, an inconsistent regulatory and
legal environment, insecurity and a slow and ineffective judicial system.
The foregoing result must, however, be buttressed by a discussion of the incentives
regime on its own terms.
5.8 Appraisal of Tax Incentive Programs
Before an incentive program is rolled out, there must be criteria which should
influence the industries and products to be promoted by means of tax benefits. The
nature and scope of the tax benefits granted, including the time for which they should
be granted, must be known with certainty. There must also be a mechanism in place to
administer the program, whether on a quasi-automatic qualifying or on a discretionary
basis.81 Again, the effect and influence of the administrative style for attracting new
industries should be analyzed, and controls should be established to monitor the
approved companies and sanctions to be applied to ensure compliance with the terms
of the contract.82 The success of these incentives in attracting the desired new
investments in terms of cost and revenue foregone should be compared to establish
the benefit received. Finally, the nature and structure of the benefits that appear to be
most attractive must be determined.83
As noted earlier, a holistic appraisal can only be undertaken based on the record of
new businesses formed, including the number of projects approved in the different
industries. Also, data must include the amount of capital invested, the size of domestic
employment created, payroll and other relevant data. The appraisal must be ex-post in
order to determine how successful the plan is in attracting foreign capital. Though
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difficult, the cost of the fiscal incentives to government in relation to the benefits
received must also be determined notwithstanding that, in reality, this might be
difficult to do because of the varying degrees of the risk involved in most new
ventures.84
It is also important to determine the influence that methods of administering the
incentives have on attracting them. As well, the nature and structure of the benefits
that appear to be most attractive must be understood.85 Since it is impossible to
determine exactly by how much tax benefits actually exceeded the amount necessary
to induce a business, knowing the quantum of benefits to be granted cannot be exactly
done. More so since the value at stake is not even accounted for by the tax
concessions granted for investments that would nonetheless, have been made.86
5.9 Tax Incentives Program in Nigeria: An Appraisal
In concrete terms, the theoretical expectation is that the operation of the incentives
system should be sensitive to the circumstances of the economy; the competence of
tax administration; the type of investment being encouraged and the budgetary
constraints of the government.87 In terms of outcome, an effective and efficient
incentive should stimulate investment in the desired sector or location, with
occasional minimal revenue leakage, and must provide minimal opportunities for tax
planning. It must also be transparent and easy to understand, and must have specific
policy goals.88
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5.9.1 Tax Incentives and the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission
The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) is the Federal Government
Agency established by the NIPC Act N0. 16 of 1995 to promote, co-ordinate and
monitor all investments in Nigeria. The One Stop Investment Centre (OSIC)89
coordinates and streamlines the processing and issuance of necessary business entry
requirements by simplifying, shortening and clarifying administrative and regulatory
requirements for entry into the economy. The Centre provides statistical data and
information on the Nigerian economy, investment climate, legal and regulatory
framework, as well as sector and industry specific information to aid existing and
prospective investors in making informed business decisions.90
The Nigerian Government has put in place a number of investment incentives for the
stimulation of private sector investment from within and outside the country. While
some of these incentives cover both private and public sectors, others are limited to
some specific sectors. The nature and application of these incentives have been
considerably simplified as identified and discussed below.
The incentives are now applied in virtually all sectors of the economy, namely,
industry, agriculture, manufacturing, petroleum, solid minerals, energy, tourism and
several others. Even though the basic forms of tax incentives are financial, fiscal and
regulatory,91 Nigeria prefers fiscal incentives because they are easily affordable to
promote investment, and do not require upfront use of government funds.92 The
regulatory incentives take the form of concessions, exemptions from labour or
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environmental standards, and subsidized infrastructure.

93

The incentives can be sub-

divided into general and sector-specific ones.
5.9.2 General Incentives
General incentives are those available to all organizations irrespective of their sector.
They include pioneer status tax holiday, capital allowance and various forms of
investment allowances. For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on pioneer status tax
holiday.
5.9.2.1 Pioneer Status Tax holiday
The pioneer status incentive is administered by the NIPC in collaboration with the
Industrial Inspectorate Department of the Federal Ministry of Industry Trade, and
Investment (FMITI), and the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). It is a tax
holiday granted to qualified or (eligible) industries anywhere in the Nigerian
federation. It can be extended for a period between 3-5years and up to 7 years in
respect of industries located in economically disadvantaged local government areas of
Nigeria. To qualify, a joint venture company or a wholly foreign-owned company
must have a minimum share capital of 10 million Naira and must have incurred a
capital expenditure of not less than five million Naira. A qualified indigenous
company should have not less than N150, 000.00 in share capital. In addition, an
application in respect of pioneer status must be submitted within one year of the
applicant company starting commercial production; otherwise the application will be
time-barred.94
A pioneer status incentive is granted to companies in industries that are deemed not
operated on a scale suitable to Nigeria’s economic requirements. It is in the public
interest to exclude them from payment of taxes in their formative years. However, the
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profit so generated is expected to be ploughed back into the business.95 The status is
granted to a firm that qualifies in a list of pioneer industries approved by the
President.96 This list is reviewed periodically.97 During the pioneer status holiday
period, dividends are tax free, and losses and capital allowance incurred on assets can
be carried forward.98
Nigeria grants a tax holiday between 3 to 5 years. This comprises an initial period of 3
years plus the possibility of renewal for another two years.99 In reality, the NIPC, for
over a decade, granted tax holiday to successful applicants for a straight period of 5
years. It was only recently that it decided to revert to the three-year rule.100 The length
of the holiday depends on the region of the country in which the investment is made.
Another factor is the class of industry and degree of the investment.101
5.9.2.2 Accessing Pioneer Status in Nigeria
The NIPC is interested in the value addition which can be brought in through
utilization of local raw materials, products, and services, in order to stimulate the
growth of indigenous capacity, employment generation with evidence for capacity
building, transfer of technology, and ability to develop local know-how for
indigenous employees to boost entrepreneurship and investment in the economy. On
top of these, an applicant must have a corporate social responsibility policy statement
which must show intended contribution to sustainable development in the immediate
community in which the investment is located.102 The commitment must be in areas
such as provision of portable water, roads, and schools. As well, the investment must
95
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show an export potential to complement foreign exchange inflow into the Nigerian
economy.103
Without a doubt, there is an abundance of these incentives directed at various industry
sectors. For purposes of this thesis, l examine two (2) of the sectoral incentives in the
agricultural and the manufacturing sectors.
5.9.3 Sectoral Incentives
These incentives are designed for specific sectors, and virtually every sector of
economic activity has some form of them. For instance, in 1999, the tourism sector
was accorded the preferred sector status in preparation for the FIFA World Youth
Championship hosted by Nigeria. This qualified the tourism sector for tax holidays
and soft loans with longer moratorium periods. In the telecommunication sector,
installation of telecommunications related equipment is considered a pioneering
activity, and so enjoys 3 to 5 years’ tax holiday in addition to other non-fiscal
incentives.104 Likewise, in the transport sector, investment in shipbuilding, repairs and
maintenance of vessels, boats and barges are considered as pioneer activities and so
enjoy 3 to 5 years’ tax holiday depending on their location.105
5.9.3.1 Agricultural Sector
Companies in the agro-allied business in Nigeria do not have restrictions imposed on
their capital allowance. It is granted in full, i.e., 100%. The payments of minimum tax
by companies that make small or no profits at all do not apply to agro-allied
businesses.106 Agro-allied plant and equipment enjoy enhanced capital allowances of
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up to 50%.107 In addition, the processing of agricultural produce is regarded as a
pioneer industry; consequently, it enjoys 100% tax-free period for 5 years.108
Agricultural and agro-allied machinery also enjoy 1% duty on their machinery and
equipment. They are also supported by the Central Bank of Nigeria through the
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) with up to 75% guarantee for
all loans relating to agricultural production and processing granted to the sector by
Nigerian commercial banks.109 Furthermore, there is, under the Interest Drawback
Program Fund, a further benefit in the form of a 60% repayment of interest paid by
entities that borrow from banks under the ACGSF, for the purpose of cassava
production and processing, provided such borrowers repay their loans on schedule.110
5.9.3.2 Manufacturing Sector
This sector comprises those industries involved in adding value to raw materials and
turning them into products.111 The expectation is that the manufacturing activities will
contribute to Nigeria’s GDP. The various benefits extended to them are set out in the
sub-sections that follow.
5.9.3.2.1 Capital Allowance
Capital allowances are tax savings on acquisition of capital assets by a company.
These are of two types: initial allowance and annual allowance.112 Together, they
permit companies to write off the capital costs on qualifying assets for tax purposes in
a given accounting period.113 The amount of capital allowance to be enjoyed in any
year of assessment is restricted to 75 percent of assessable profit per annum for
companies in the manufacturing sector, 66 percent for other sectors, and those in
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agro-allied industries are granted 100 percent on leased assets and an additional
investment allowance of 10 percent on leased assets for agricultural plants and
equipment.114
5.9.3.2.2 Investment in Infrastructure
This is a form of incentive granted to industries that provide facilities that, ordinarily,
should have been provided by government.115 Of course, this incentive also benefits
the investors’ access to its location. The people in the locality where it is established
also enjoy the spillover effects, including to facilitate their economic activities. The
facilities in view include access roads, pipe borne water and electricity. Twenty
percent (20%) of the cost of providing these infrastructural facilities, where they do
not exist, is tax deductible.116
5.9.3.2.3 Investment in Economically Disadvantaged Areas
Without prejudice to the provision of the pioneer status enabling law,117 a pioneer
industry sited in an economically disadvantaged Local Government Area is entitled to
100% tax holiday for seven years, and an additional 5% capital depreciation
allowance over and above the initial capital depreciation allowance.118
5.9.3.2.4 Replacement of Obsolete Plant and Re-Investment allowance
Manufacturing industries further enjoy an additional 15% investment tax credit for
expenditure incurred to replace all obsolete plant and machinery. As well, where a
manufacturing company incurs qualifying capital expenditure for purposes such as
approved expansion, a generalized allowance of capital expenditure is granted for
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three activities: expansion of production capacity, modernization of production
facilities and diversification into related products.
5.9.3.2.5 Duty Drawback Scheme and Facilities
First, the duty drawback scheme provides for refunds of duties/surcharges on raw
materials, including packaging materials used for the manufacturing of products upon
effective exportation of the final products.119 The new scheme gives automatic
refunds (60%) on initial screening by the Duty Drawback Committee and upon the
presentation of a bond from a recognized Bank, insurance company or other financial
institution.120 The bond covers 60% of the refund to be made to the exporter and will
only be discharged after final processing of the application is made.121 After
processing an exporter’s claims, the Duty Drawback Committee grants a balance
where applicable, or in regard to a request for refund for any over-payment made.122
Second, a duty drawback facility provides for fixed drawback and individual
drawback facilities. The fixed drawback facility is for exporters/producers whose
export products are listed in the fixed drawback schedule to be issued from time to
time by the Committee.123 When the import content of the export produce is constant,
and import prices (including exchange rate), tariff rates and technology used are
relatively stable or “fixed”, it is possible to calculate a standard Input-Output Coefficient Schedule (ICS) for these categories of products based on which a fixed
drawback rate can be computed to be rebated per unit of export product.124
Since the individual drawback is for producers/exporters who do not qualify under the
fixed drawback facilities, it is a straight forward traditional drawback mechanism
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under which duty is paid on all import inputs. Subsequently, the duties are rebated on
inputs used for export production.
As a general case, the final export/producer can apply to benefit under the scheme. As
well, a trading company which collects industrial products from one or more
manufacturers, as well as a trading company which imports raw material inputs
including packaging and packaging materials used for the production of goods
exported by him, could also apply under the scheme.125 Such a trading company must
have entered into a contract with a final producer of the product in such a way that the
Duty Drawback Committee can obtain the necessary information and documents to
enable it decide appropriately. Applicants must be companies incorporated in
Nigeria.126
As outlined, the operation of the schemes in Nigeria can now be appraised in regard to
their key features and performance outcomes. Specifically, I consider exemptions
from import duties offered to the manufacturing sector, the incentives to export
through free trade zones, subsidies to the upstream and downstream petroleum sector,
and the credit schemes and capital allowances given to the agricultural sector.
5.9.4 Incentive Schemes in Operation: An assessment
A pioneer status incentive is granted under the Industrial Development (Income Tax)
Relief Act (“IDITRA”). The grant consists of tax holidays to companies in terms of
exempting their profits from taxation under the principal statute, the Companies
Income Tax Act. Entities that gain this privilege rely heavily on “packaging”127 to
merit it. Consequently, there are homogenous products that do not receive the same
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privilege. But overall, the proliferation of incentives to cushion the operating and
financial risks of doing business in Nigeria have not brought the beneficial impact on
economic development that the scheme promises. The reasons for this are as follows.
5.9.4.1 General Overview
First, in the manufacturing sector, the provision of government intended support in the
form of reduced import duties on raw materials is bedeviled with corruption. Only
people who have some influence in government enjoy this benefit.128 This policy, on
its own merit is desirable. However, its implementation is poorly monitored in an
atmosphere of pervasive administrative and governance corruption. The process is
further politicized, meaning that in practice, manufacturing companies that apply
without adding the appropriate “thank you” to the application will not be granted the
status even when they are qualified.129 In the midst of all this, it is worth pointing out
that not many manufacturing industries are aware that the incentives exist.130
Second is the case of the export free trade zone. The politicization of its benefit
begins with the cost of real property in the zone: the cost is not within the reach of
small and medium sized industries.131 A case in point is the location of Dangote Oil
Refinery that intends to serve the whole of West Africa.
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Third, Nigeria’s manufacturing industries contend with rapid technological change.132
This is much worse where the investment in machinery is custom-made. In this case,
the net realizable value is virtually nil to the company. Overall, the key performance
indicators, such as liquidity, profitability, cash flow and market growth are not
impressive for the sectors. Consequently, the return on investment measured by return
on equity and cost of debt capital is dismal.
5.9.4.2 Monitoring and Enforcement in Nigeria
A major issue in regard to assessing incentive as noted earlier, is monitoring and
enforcement. Nigeria’s experience is that once an approval is given, the responsibility
to ensure that the terms of agreement are implemented is usually not assigned to
anyone within the administrative structure. In other words, no official oversees the
activities of the approved entity in relation to agreed commencement time, price and
quality controls, employment of local labour force, local content percentage and other
matters set out in the agreement.133 Sanctions against violations of the terms of the
incentive laws and contracts in the nature of fines for offences like failure to start
production within agreed timeline, or inadequate record keeping are not applied.
Worse is the fact that more serious contraventions of the terms of the contract that
should result in suspension or cancellation of the tax benefits are not addressed.
5.9.4.3 Monitoring Tax Holidays in Nigeria
As already discussed, relief from income taxes increases the profit prospects of new
ventures and enables a firm to recover its capital costs more quickly. This reduces its
risk of exposure. But tax holidays place a significant burden on tax administration and
on other taxpayers who have to bear the tax shortfall. The holidays can be
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manipulated and used to cause distortions in the pricing system of a company and to
enable it to shift profits from taxed activities to untaxed activities. Though tax
administrators may be able to determine what constitutes “arm’s length” prices and
re-allocate prices appropriately, the fact is that the exercise is a difficult one. National
tax administrators have difficulty determining the actual incomes and expenses of a
company, especially one that is part of an MNE group operating in different
jurisdictions and with highly integrated operations.134
The general experience is that the granting of tax holiday on account of pioneer status
has been grossly abused.135 During the period of tax holidays, tax authorities, most
often, do not check the books of account of the companies. This allows the companies
to take advantage of loss carry forward opportunities.136 These have been the
experience of Nigeria with respect to the performance of the tax liability regime in the
three sectors identified, namely, manufacturing, agriculture and exports.
5.9.4.4 Import Duties Exemptions on Raw Materials
Nigeria has import and export duty exemptions and reductions on several items.
These duties are the oldest form of modern taxation.137 They represent taxes on
imports into Nigeria and are charged as a percentage of the value of the imports or as
a fixed amount contingent on quality.
Import duties were Nigeria’s highest yielding indirect tax138 prior to the introduction
of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986.139 The Nigerian Custom
Services (NCS) administer the tax. Relief from customs duties on imports of
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equipment and construction materials enables a firm to reduce its capital requirements
and lower its fixed costs. When custom duties are high, partial or total exemption
may provide an incentive for new investment.140
Nigeria has little to show for the exemption of raw materials from import duties due
to poor monitoring and enforcement. There are instances where these waivers which,
ideally, are meant for raw materials, machinery and spare parts, are granted
indiscriminately to cover many questionable items like clothing, furniture, and other
luxury items that have no bearing on the economy.141 Relief from duties on imports of
raw and semi-processed materials and of components generally provides a
competitive advantage for establishing a domestic or foreign market.

They are

necessary as instruments of economic growth in the value chain. The most unsettling
factor is that most of these waivers are granted on the basis of political patronage,142
which makes them an economic waste and a major source of tax evasion. George Lent
tells us that, import duty concessions to pioneer companies from 1955 and 1965 in
Nigeria was estimated at £17 million. Along with other financial benefits of £14.3
million, it adds up to £37.3 million lost revenue. In today’s terms, this total loss to
Nigeria’s economy is even heavier. Indeed, as shown in section 5.7 above, Nigeria’s
losses from granting incentives, including the holiday benefits, continue to increase to
the detriment of the national treasury.
5.9.4.5 Export Expansion Grant, Loss and Depreciation Deferring
Finally, are a trio of incentives whose application also occasion losses for Nigeria.
First is the export expansion grant introduced in 1976 to encourage non-oil products
140
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exports with the export expansion grant. This entitles exporters to a certain percentage
of their turnover. However, its abuse is rather startling, so much so that the Federal
Government has suspended the programme.143 This outcome is one casualty of the
lack of monitoring, enforcement and sanction which have marked the administration
of the program.
Second, while the loss carry-over period allows a sufficient period for a company to
offset its operating losses, the period should not be in perpetuity. The non-inclusion of
sunset clauses in Nigeria’s incentive legislations has greatly encouraged the presence
of such long periods of exemption from taxation under this scheme. Obviously, the
loss to the state is very high.
Finally, in Nigeria, a pioneer company is deemed to start a new business on the day
following the end of its relief period.144 It is from this point that initial and annual
allowances begin to be granted. If the tax holiday period is extended due to losses, the
initial allowance is reduced by one fifth for each year of the extension.145 Some
scholars believe this practice is not justifiable because, in effect, it permits the tax-free
recovery of capital investment twice. The first time is when depreciation is deferred
during the exemption period and, second, when it is subsequently deducted to arrive
at the taxable income. This distorts accounting records and creates reconciliation
challenges.146 Over all, the state has to wait for overly long periods to recoup any
corporate tax, if at all.
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5.10 Conclusion
Nigeria’s integration within the global economy demands that it creates and maintains
a competitive edge in order to advance its economic performance through growth. A
major means of doing this is to attract foreign direct investment into salient areas of
economic potential. As shown, Nigeria’s petroleum industry, along with agriculture
and manufacturing, among others, offer ripe avenues for this purpose.
Notwithstanding its uncertain benefits, tax incentives have been utilized since
Nigeria’s independence, to facilitate and enhance economic establishment and output
in identified sectors. The calculated expectation is that within a reasonable time, the
state would derive tax income from these thriving sectors to fund other aspects of
overall national socio-economic development and services.
This chapter’s description, analysis and performance assessment of Nigeria’s tax
incentive, from the primeval tool of tax holiday to various grants and loss and
depreciation deferrals, show that the regimes’ operation has not worked well. Its
administration has been bedeviled by untrammeled exercise of discretion by the civil
administrators of the schemes. As well, the scheme has run on political patronage.
This culture of corruption has been compounded by virtual absence of monitoring and
compliance enforcement of expectations and obligations set out for each specific
incentive scheme.
The overall result is heavy loss of tax revenue and distortion of economic
development priority goals. There is also a large undermining of the rule of law in
economic administration and virtual ignoring of the objectives of national tax policy.
The logical question is whether Nigeria can reform such a moribund and resource-
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draining scheme, and in what ways. These concerns are spoken to in a few salient
areas in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
6.0 Conclusion
This thesis began with a concise description of the fundamental principles of taxation,
emphasizing that a functionally effective economy must be underlain by a good tax
policy regime marked, ultimately, by equitable principles of tax imposition and
administration. Given its focus on identifying the problems with using tax incentives
to boost socio-economic development in Nigeria, the preceding chapters drew on
studies and scholarly analyses to conclude that developing countries do not, on
balance, benefit their econpomies by using tax incentives to attract investment. Not
only do they deprive them of tax revenue, they also do not play any major roles in
attracting the desired investments. More specifically, it was shown that though
Nigeria’s incentive regime is generous to investors and includes salient features that
could ensure its reasonably successful operation, the corruption culture that bedeviled
the process contributed to the losses the incentive has brought about for the country.
This final chapter offers some recommendations to inform a reform of the regime. My
modest ideas call for tax policy reviews along with the overhaul of the scheme’s
legislative and regulatory provisions to better express and authorize implementation
of the new policy. I also draw attention to the need to change the culture of politics
and civil administration that oversees the implementation of the rules, including
judicial views of what objectives and targets Nigeria’s tax laws should serve. The
conclusion highlights the main theme of this thesis and the overall tenor of its reform
recommendations.
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6.1 Tax Policy Review
As discussed, taxation is the most sustainable means of generating government
revenue. Naturally, Nigeria must broaden its tax base by taxing capital gains, benefits
in kind, and other types of passive income. Doing so will enhance fairness and equity
in the tax system. It also requires that Nigeria’s taxes must be streamlined, rather than
for energy to be spent framing more areas of taxation, as the country recently did by
increasing its number of taxes from 39 to 61.1 Such a move, in fact, compounds the
problem of “the ease of doing business”2 that the government recently committed to
eliminate. This policy must be accompanied by its corollary, namely, clear decisions
on what socio-economic issues must be tackled by tax expenditures. In other words,
the current over-broad accommodation of sectors that can benefit from tax
expenditure must be streamlined through rationalization. The comprehensive point to
make here is that Nigeria’s National Development Plans must contain criteria to
determine what sectors may be admitted into the incentive program and what socioeconomic and fiscal realities may justify the extension of a benefit to a particular
economic actor.3
A third and related policy change is the need for government to ensure that it is able
to estimate the cost of incentives as a basis for assessing its effectiveness.4 A simple
and effective way, according to Vito Tanzi and Howell Lee, is that the Nigerian
government can do this is to determine the amount of credit due to a qualified

1

“Taxes payable by manufacturers up from 39, now 61”, Vanguard (17 June 2016),
online:<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/06/taxes-payable-manufacturers-39-now-61/>.
2
The latest World Bank Doing Business Report 2018 reported that of 190 countries surveyed, Nigeria
occupies the 145th position. World Bank, Doing Business 2018 Reforming to Create Jobs
(Washington,
DC:
World
Bank
Publications,
2018)
at
7,
online:
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/nigeria/#close>.
3
In some cases, an incentive is tied to a particular purpose, for instance, if government want to
encourage employment of locals, it can include a threshold as to the minimum number of Nigerians
that must be employed.
4
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Global Survey (New York: UN, 2000) at 18.
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enterprise and to "deposit" this amount into a special tax account in the form of a
book keeping entry.5 In all other respects, the enterprise must be treated like an
ordinary taxpayer, subject to all applicable tax regulations, including the obligation to
file tax returns. The only difference would be that its income tax liabilities would be
paid from credits "withdrawn" from its tax account.6 In this way, information is
always available regarding the budget revenue foregone and on the amount of tax
credits still available to the enterprise.
A policy decision to institute the foregoing suggestions will re-launch Nigeria’s
incentive program on a course of potential effectiveness, if not in terms of their fiscal
benefit to the country, at least, in regard to political commitment to integrity and
responsibility in overseeing its implementation and administration. On this footing, it
will be easy to decide, on the basis of reliable records and data, whether any scheme
should be scrapped, when, how, and for what reason, or modified and in what respect.

6.2 Legal Complexity and Judicial Interpretation of Tax Laws and
Regulations
Nigeria’s tax laws are complex and difficult for the common taxpayer to understand.
As well, some tax cases are problematic even for officials and tax administrators to
resolve. In addition to lack of understanding, many taxpayers are unaware of the
existence of certain tax liabilities under the existing tax laws. Compliance with this
system is made more challenging by the laziness of tax officials, uncooperative
taxpayers and the official habit of quick fixes.7 In Nigeria, ‘the best of judgement
assessment’ approach has become the handy resort for tax administrators in resolving
tax liability disputes. This does not only reflect poor tax education of officials and the

5

Vito Tanzi & Howell Zee, Tax Policy in Developing Countries (Washington D.C: IMF, 2001) at 12.
Ibid at 13.
7
Micah Leyira et al, ‘‘Tax Systems in Nigeria- Challenges and the Way Forward” (2012) 3:5 Research
J Fin & Acc at 10.
6
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public regarding responsibilities (for officials), and for the public, of their tax rights,
duties and entitlements.8 It is suggested that simplified tax legislation that is also
comprehensive in its coverage of taxable income-generating activities will more
easily yield to official and public education about its requirements.9
The accompaniment to this reform of the tax laws is their interpretation. Thus far,
Nigeria has glued itself to interpreting its tax laws according to the literal
understanding of their provisions.10 The attitude of the Nigerian courts is to look
merely at what is clearly said. They take the view that there is no room for tax law
interpretation to be informed by legislative intent. As discussed in chapter 5, this
literal view may not help the state achieve its tax policy objectives, and, therefore,
may not be helpful in the fight against tax malpractice in Nigeria. In this regard,
Nigerian courts can learn from those in Canada. To curtail, particularly, tax
avoidance, Canadian courts have adopted various approaches to the interpretation of
tax legislation. They have moved away from a strict or literal meaning approach,
towards a textual, contextual and purposive interpretations. This combination allows
for judicial creativity on the basis of principle, and encourages boldness to enable
judges shed the timidity engendered by the literal rule which, in Nigeria, as discussed
in chapter 5, allowed the judges to let off foreign investors from their tax liabilities to
the state.

8

The Best of Judgement assessment is a tax assessment method employed where a taxpayer does not
provide an audited account or where an individual did not provide a statement of net worth for the
purpose of tax assessment. It also refers to a situation where the tax authorities believe that the
assessable profit declared for the purpose of determining tax liability is under-declared, in which case,
it may be requested to pay more tax.
9
Vern Krishna, Fundamentals of Income Tax, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 32.
10
The rule in IRC v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 has been profoundly influential in forming tax
opinion based on the literal interpretation of the Act.
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6.3 Current Problems with the Incentive Structure
6.3.1 Capacity / Training of Tax Administrators
Along with the foregoing, tax administration must be strengthened in line with new
policy changes that must be introduced, including those suggested above. In
particular, enhanced technical training must be instituted for tax auditors. It is
inadequate and inconsistent with the demands of a robust tax regime, including a
structure of incentives, to have, out of six thousand plus workers, only 13%
professionally qualified tax administrators.11
The Nigerian tax administration12 and related individual agencies suffer from
limitations in manpower, money, tools and machinery to meet the increasing
challenges and difficulties of administering tax. In fact, the negative attitude of most
tax collectors toward taxpayers is said to arise from their poor remuneration and
motivation.13 Anecdotal evidence for Nigeria shows that staff are not provided with
regular training to keep them abreast with developments in tax-related matters.14 This
makes the administration of taxes in terms of total coverage and accurate assessment
very weak. Clearly, capacity enhancement through training must go hand in hand with
improved remuneration if Nigeria is to have an informed, competent and dedicated
group of government revenue service workers.

11

Micah Leyira et al, supra note 7 at 10.
In terms of efficiency, Nigeria tax administration has performed woefully. See World Bank data on
paying
taxes
in
Nigeria
Online:
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/explore
economies/nigeria/#paying-taxes>. According to the World Bank, if governments can embrace
standard world best practice in the area of ease of paying business taxes, transfer of property, exporting
goods, importing goods and resolution of commercial dispute, more than 45 million days of
entrepreneurs’ time will be saved. See <www.doingbusiness.org/reports/case-studies/2014/cost-of-redtape>. Published May 2015.
13
Micah Leyira et al, supra note 7 at 10.
14
Ibid at 12.
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6.3.2 Incentive Granting Committee
Fundamental to appropriate incentive grants to qualified entities is the competence
and interests of those who make the grant decisions. For the granting of pioneer
status, it is recommended that government agencies most concerned should be part of
a committee that should make this decision. The committee should consist of an
advisory board drawn from representatives of the agency mandated with the review of
investment proposals. Other bodies to be represented, according to Louis Wells,15 are
the planning and development boards, the Ministers of Finance, Commerce and
Industry, Minister in charge of the sector where the firm will operate, a technical
official to review and appraise the technical merits of the proposal, and the agency in
charge of implementation, compliance review and enforcement of investment laws. In
addition, I propose that officials from the Federal and State Inland Revenue Agencies
should be members of the committee. This is to ensure adequate representation from
all concerned parties. Nigeria’s resources exploitation and mining industries have
overly generous incentives that need to be streamlined to curb the great deal of rent
seeking activity that characterizes them and facilitates above market returns for the
companies working in the sector.16
An important aspect to this administrative change is the discretionary element of the
exercise of decision-making authority by this body. It is advisable to minimize the
discretionary element in the incentive-granting process. This will enhance the need for

15

There seems to be agreement between Louis Wells and George Lent on the constituting members for
the review of such application. See Wells Louis J et al, Using Tax Incentive to Compete for Foreign
Investment: Are They Worth the Costs? Occasion Paper 15, The IFC and the World Bank (Washington
D.C: World Bank, 2001), online:<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/01/1614958/usingtax-incentives-compete-foreign-investment-worth-costs> at 34; George E Lent, Tax Incentive for
Investment in Developing Countries IMF (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1976) at 283.
16
Rent seeking behaviour is particularly pervasive in the petroleum sector. Of course, this is also the
case for other sectors, including agriculture. Despite government effort to support farmers by providing
quality seedlings, it has to do this in conjunction other agents who thwart the process and divert these
benefits to “leather-box farmers”. To this end, all wind fall gains are rent.
[121]

manifest transparency in the decision-making process, and limit the corruption and
rent-seeking activities that have, thus far, virtually oiled it.17
6.4 The Broader Taxation and Political Environment
A series of inter-related elements of taxation and its administration in the overall
political oversight of economic management are germane to the success of the
reforms that more directly pertain to reform of the incentive system. Some of these
are now addressed.
6.4.1 Curb Unhealthy Tax Competition
Tax competition has undermined the potential for the incentive regime to be effective
in Nigeria. As discussed earlier, Nigeria’s overall tax system is riddled with
incentives. This inevitably provides fertile ground for rent-seeking activities.
Therefore, to allow Nigeria’s market to take proper root towards fiscal profitability,
the Nigerian government must refrain from reliance on poorly targeted tax incentives
as the main vehicle for investment promotion.18 In this regard, its tendency to also
impose foreign exchange controls exacerbates, in reverse fashion, the business and
regulatory challenges that companies doing business in Nigeria face. These controls
throttle their business opportunities and potential to be competitive and profitable.
Consequently, by these controls, the state undermines its own opportunities to raise
revenue from corporate dividend and profit tax liabilities. Broadly associated with this
17

Recently, the National Assembly invited senior management of a prominent oil firm over an oil deal
in which even the former president of Nigeria was indicted. See The Guardian March 5, 2017 “The oil
deal,
the
disgraced
former
minister,
and
$800m
paid
via
a
UK
Bank,
online:<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/mar/05/the-oil-deal-the-disgraced-minister-and800m-paid-via-a-uk-bank>.
18
The Nigerian government appears to have realized the fact that non-tax factors are even more
important. The government is working tirelessly to rein in on the issue of insecurity which has
metamorphosed into a humanitarian crisis. Also, in May 2016, the Kaduna State government declared a
state of emergency following an outbreak, which threatens the supply of tomato, called Tomato Ebola.
However, the government having curtailed the vandalization of pipeline has been able to ramp up
accretion to the federation account. The CBN is actively managing the availability of forex to crucial
sectors of the economy and this is beginning to be reflected, for instance in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI).
[122]

is the country’s need to remove inconsistencies in its regulations regarding, among
others, protection of intellectual property and profit repatriation.19 Nigeria needs to
arrest these regulatory inconsistencies in the interest of fiscal stability.

6.4.2 Structural Problems in the Economy
Nigeria has been moving away from direct to indirect taxation, a change considered to
be less distortionary. The potential for maximizing the benefits of this change is
constrained by structural problems in the economy. 20 First is the predominance of the
informal sector. This constitutes more than 50 percent of the country’s economy and
enables most domestic production to circumvent, for instance, the Value Added Tax
(VAT).21 Income tax is similarly difficult to assess and collect because operations in
the informal sector are rudimentary and keep inadequate records. Consequently, the
guesses that the Nigerian tax administration often makes for the tax liabilities of
actors in this sector open up tax evasion opportunities.22 It is pointed out that the
proportion of the self-employed, relative to the total working population, is
substantial.23 Thus, for the tax authorities to not have devised appropriate and
effective means for collecting personal income tax from this group leaves the national
treasury poorer, and deepens inequity in the structure of tax liability.24

19

This is the case with airline funds trapped in five countries due to foreign exchange challenges
Venezuela, $3.780 billion; Nigeria, $591 million; Sudan, $360 million; Egypt, $291 million; Angola,
$ 237. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) hinted that foreign airlines may withdraw
services in Nigeria and other countries where their revenues were trapped unless they urgently release
the
trapped
money
estimated
at
about
$5.1
billion,
online:
https://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/finance/airlines-hit-african-foreign-currency-crunch/>.
20
Micah Leyira et al, supra note 7 at 11.
21
Ibid at 11.
22
The Minister for Information and Culture dropped the hint alluding that Nigeria losses about $1tn to
tax evasion and avoidance. See “FG: $1tn Lost to Tax Evasion, Avoidance” This day (4 August 2016),
online: <http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/08/04/fg-1tn-lost-to-tax-evasion-avoidance/>.
23
There is a high population of self-employed persons who are not yet in the tax net.
24
The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) boss Babatunde Fowler stated that the tax base for
individuals in Nigeria is 10million. See “Total Tax Base of Individuals in Nigeria is 10million”, The
Punch (19 July 2016), online: <http://punchng.com/total-tax-base-individuals-nigeria-10m-fowler/>.
Fowler said this at the 2016 Tax Week of the Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria (CITN) with
the theme: “The dilemma of improving tax revenue generation in tough economic times’’.
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This situation further aggravates the public perception that in Nigeria, not only is tax
liability very unfair, but it is made so through enforcing it by corrupt procedures.25
At what point Nigerian policymakers, bureaucracies, and taxpayers are ready to make
fundamental changes toward reducing corrupt practices is a question to which there is
no easy answer. But as noted earlier, globalization has increased the urgency for such
fundamental changes. Whether the needed changes will appear or not depends largely
on political will. Given the internal dynamics of Nigerian society and governance, the
point to emphasize here is that whenever changes are put on, they must be on a
variety of fronts, and they must be applied on an on-going basis over a long period of
time. The changes must involve individual and societal mindsets, as well as
institutional procedures and their enforcement. The changes in view must begin at the
core of government’s own operations, such as those pointed out in the next subsection.
6.4.3 Non-Transparent Tax Expenditure
The failure of the three tiers of government to provide social amenities affects tax
compliance. Apart from resources mismanagement, more than 70 per cent of revenue
is spent on recurrent operations, leaving barely anything to fund development
projects.26 To many taxpayers, this means that the fundamental purpose of
government is always unrealized, and so the moral obligation to pay taxes also no
longer exists.27 In this regard, it seems hopeful that the Nigerian government has

25

Micah Leyira et al, supra note 7 at 28.
There had been accusations and counter accusations on the cost of governance. Many Nigerians are
even questioning the rationale for a National Assembly. The governor of Kaduna, Mallam El-Rufai
challenged the National Assembly to shed light of their budget. In a swift reaction, the National
Assembly points out that they only gulp 5% of the national budget which is over N100billion, online:
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/228511-el-rufai-accepts-dogara-challengepublishes-details-salary-kaduna-security-vote-other.html>.
27
The citizen tax sensitivity is recently heightened due to hardship borne by many Nigerians. Professor
Itse Sagay decried the prevailing situation and exposed some data on the spending of political office
26
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realised the need to work transparently, and the current government is working
assiduously to improve transparency. It is, however, too early to conclude that this
commitment is yielding fruit.

6.4.4 Attention to Non-Tax Factors
Finally, there are a range of non-tax factors that condition the prospects of success for
any tax reform agenda. Nigeria’s economic life is full of them. The details of how
these may be tackled is beyond the scope of this thesis and the focus of its modest tax
incentive reform recommendations. But it completes the recognition and
acknowledgement that taxation, however organized and administered, including its
specialized schemes like incentives, depend on every other factor of socio-economic
life and activity to achieve its objectives. So, these factors which Nigeria must assess
and work on in terms of their implications for, and impact on tax incentives reform
include: national market size; access to raw materials for relevant operators;
availability and cost of skilled labour; access to and condition of infrastructure
including transportation facilities; political stability; macro-economic stability
(foreign exchange); and business financing costs.28

6.5 Conclusion
As demonstrated especially in Chapter 5, the various tax incentives have had little or
no positive effect on the Nigerian economy. At best, it can only be argued that though
holders, online: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/09/sagay-hits-senate-says-ones-buying- clotheswear/>.
28
The International Trade Administration (ITA) a department of the U.S. Department of Commerce put
together a market overview on Nigeria. See <https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Nigeria-MarketOverview>. On the flip side, the Nigerian government has been encouraging more Nigerians to go into
farming, especially rice cultivation. It believes that with the effort currently being made in Nigeria to
stop the importation of rice by meeting the nationwide demand of 7 million tonnes through local
production annually by the year 2018, the country will be saving $7m daily in its foreign reserves.
Also, government is subsidizing tractors, mills and fertilizers as well as arranging cheaper loans to
boost production. Despite rice growing being a government priority, many farmers still grow with their
bare hands. Government also provides quality seedlings and teaches farming practices to improve
output. However, farmers complain that endemic corruption means government help does not always
reach them.
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laden with good intentions, the yield from operating the regime in Nigeria has done
virtually nothing to bring economic benefits in terms of fair taxation of locals and
foreign investors and, therefore, no improvement in government revenue intake from
the incentive sector.

Nigeria’s huge potential in human and mineral resources should have accorded her the
right of first refusal to direct foreign investment. However, this advantage has not
been utilized because of bad leadership and corruption.29 Also culpable is the
attendant infrastructural decay which has reduced the country to desperately seeking
FDI to improve this area. In the process, Nigeria competes with smaller economies to
attract the same investment revenue but without any greater success.30
Nigeria’s population of over 177 million makes it a large market and a depository of
affordable labor. But even these factors do not necessarily make her a choice
investment location because of its huge infrastructural weakness and inconsistent
investment policy pursuits.31 This is why many companies have relocated their
factories to neighboring countries in the face of a plethora of incentives that attracted

29

Following the adoption of the whistle blowing policy by the federal government, it is mind boggling
the amount of cash that has been discovered within a week at various locations such as shops and
apartments running into billions of naira that ideally should have been rolled into the economy and
would have generated more jobs. See Soni Daniel, “Update: How EFCC Recovered $9.8m from
Yakubu,
Ex-NNPC
GMD”,
Vanguard,
(10
February
2017)
online:
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/efcc-recovered-9-8million-yakubu-ex-nnpc-gmd/>. See also
“EFCC discovers N448m cash in Lagos shop”, The Guardian, (8 April 2017),
online:<https://guardian.ng/news/efcc-discovers-n448m-cash-in-lagos-shop/>.
30
Ghana is ranked 120th out of 190 countries in the 2018 World Bank`s Doing Business Rankings
while Nigeria occupies the 145th position. World Bank, Doing Business 2018 Reforming to Create
Jobs” (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2018) at 4. See 2108 World Bank Group Flagship
Report, online: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/AnnualReports/English/DB2018-Full-Report.pdf>.
31
The Federal Government recently launched an Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) the
thrust of which is to serve as a road map for security improvement, war against corruption, economic
revitalization and a compendium of government sectoral plans for agriculture and food security, energy
and transport infrastructure, industrialization and social investments. Nigeria, Ministry of Budget &
National Planning, “Economic Report and Growth Plan 2017-2020” (February 2017). See online:
<https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/04/09/new-economic-recovery-plans-the-road-ahead/>.
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them to Nigeria in the first place.32 The major discouragement has always been
unreliable energy supply and poor roads. The companies that remain and continue to
enjoy the incentives are not monitored for their compliance with the incentive
obligations. Just as well, the rules are not enforced when breaches are identified. In
the result, the national treasury continues to lose revenue from offering investment
incentives.

On another score, Nigeria was instrumental in the emergence of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), now the African Union.33 As well, it was a standard-bearer in
the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).34
However, due to the poor administration of its national economy, including its
taxation and tax incentive regimes, Nigeria has not been able to take advantage of the
opportunities created by these organizations to expand its participation in the
economies of its regional and continental neighboring markets.
Overall, therefore, Nigeria’s investment-attracting incentive regime needs rethinking
if the losses it engenders for revenue generation are to be reversed as part of general
tax reform to improve economic performance. First, underlying tax legislation must
be redone to streamline the tax reliefs given to investors. The goal must be to shorten
the time, and to close the loopholes that allow investors to ceaselessly enjoy not
paying any taxes under the incentive regime. Second, tax administration, especially
compliance enforcement, must be incentivized by training and paying well, a
32

Notable companies that relocated recently include Dunlop Nigeria Plc, Michelin, Prilleri. Some
other companies are rumored to be contemplating to do same. “Why Companies will Continue to
Leave
Nigeria
for
Ghana,”
This
Day
(28
March
2017),
online:
<https://www.proshareng.com/news/General/why-companies-will-continue-to-leave-Nigeria-forGhana-/7324>.
33
Muritala Dauda, Muritala Zaki Bin Ahmed & Mohammed Faisol Keling, “Nigeria’s role and its
peacekeeping challenges in Africa: An assessment” [2017] 2:3 European J Soc Sciences Stud 128 at
135.
34
Olatunde J. B Ojo, “Nigeria and the formation of ECOWAS” [1980] 34:4 International Organization
571 at 575.
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dedicated cadre of revenue workers.35 The goal here is, at least, to minimize
corruption, including political influence over tax administration, factors that have long
allowed Nigeria’s tax haven status to thrive to the detriment of national revenue
generation. Finally, the law should more equitably distribute the tax burden between
local entrepreneurs and foreign investors. Hopefully, with these changes, Nigeria may
find more tax revenue to help run its national economic activities.36

35

The Nova Scotia government is engaged in skill acquisition for its labour force. In furtherance of this
objective, the Association of Workplace Educators of Nova Scotia (AWENS) is instituted to ensure
continual training of employees in Nova Scotia. Other support includes the job junction as well as a
number of employment agencies across the province.
36
Nigeria’s tax revenue to GDP ratio is among the lowest in the world. Online:
<https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/04/23/adeosun-nigerias-tax-to-gdp-ratio-among-lowestin-the-world/>.
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